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INTRODUCTION 
In 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft announced a set of 
Department of Justice (DOJ) policies designed to curtail federal 
prosecutors’ discretion to plea bargain.1 The new DOJ rules sought to 
ensure uniform criminal punishments and prevent criminal offenders from 
cutting deals to avoid deserved punishment.2 Yet the would-be ban on 
bargaining seems to have had little, if any, effect.3 Such a result is hardly 
surprising, as the policy’s spirit of pursuing justice at all costs, however 
noble, is unworkable if the pursuers cannot actually pay all costs. 
Limitations of budget, resources, or evidence inevitably demand some 
compromises, such as a tradeoff between seeking the maximum 
punishment for each offender and ensuring some punishment for all 
 
 
 1. See Memorandum from John Ashcroft, U.S. Att’y Gen., to All Federal Prosecutors, 
Department Policy Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and Sentencing 
(Sept. 22, 2003), reprinted in 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 129 (2003) [hereinafter Ashcroft Memo]. This 
memorandum attracted a great deal of attention but followed earlier memoranda by preceding 
attorneys general who also sought to reduce discretionary bargaining. See, e.g., Reno Bluesheet on 
Charging and Plea Decisions, from Janet Reno, U.S. Att’y Gen., to Holders of U.S. Attorneys’ 
Manual, Title 9, Principles of Federal Prosecution (Oct. 12, 1993), reprinted in 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 
352 (1994); Instructions from Richard Thornburgh, U.S. Att’y Gen., to U.S. Attorneys, Plea Policy for 
Federal Prosecutors (Mar. 13, 1989), reprinted in 1 FED. SENT’G REP. 421 (1989). The Ashcroft 
memo charged prosecutors with a duty to “charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable 
offense or offenses that are supported by the facts of the case,” while avoiding charges “filed simply to 
exert leverage to induce a plea.” Ashcroft Memo, supra, at 130. Prosecutors were also not to “request 
or accede to” a downward sentencing departure except under limited circumstances. Id. at 132. 
 2. See, e.g., Gwen Filosa, Ashcroft: New Police Powers Make U.S. Safer, TIMES-PICAYUNE 
(New Orleans, La.), Sept. 26, 2003, at A7 (“‘Like federal judges, federal prosecutors have an 
obligation to be fair, uniform and to be tough,’ Ashcroft said. ‘The amount of time in prison should 
depend on the severity of the crime, not on which judge happens to be sentencing him. This is about 
equal justice under the law.’”); Joe Gyan, Jr., Ashcroft Seeks End to “Revolving Door” for Violent 
Criminals, ADVOC. (Baton Rouge, La.), Sept. 26, 2003, at 9 (“Ashcroft also defended his get-tough 
policy, saying the intent is to bring ‘uniformity and equality in justice across the board. . . . We need a 
policy that says people who commit serious crimes will be held accountable for those crimes . . . .’”); 
cf. George Fisher, A Practice as Old as Justice Itself, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2003, § 4, at 11 (“There 
are good reasons to dislike plea bargains. Justice is dealt behind closed doors rather than in the open 
air of a courtroom. Prosecutors can hijack sentencing authority from judges, and criminals can get off 
with less than they deserve.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the 
Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 113 (2005) (“Like similar directives from Attorneys General 
before him, Ashcroft’s apparent restriction of plea bargaining made headlines. On the surface, it 
appeared to be a significant reform. The memorandum’s exceptions, however, largely swallowed its 
rule.”); cf. Mary Patrice Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell, Negotiating Justice: Prosecutorial Perspectives 
on Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1063, 1078 (2006) 
(“Although the Ashcroft Memo did not have a major impact in D.C. on the content of plea agreements, 
it did tend to streamline plea negotiations . . . .”); Daniel Richman, Institutional Coordination and 
Sentencing Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2055, 2068 (2006) (“It is far from clear whether the Ashcroft 
Memorandum had any effect on line prosecutors in U.S. Attorneys’ offices.”). 
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offenders. Because Ashcroft’s memorandum could not articulate clear 
rules for how or when prosecutors could take these practical constraints 
into account, the result was more business as usual: unguided and 
unreviewable exercises of prosecutorial discretion in individual cases.4 
Both the adoption and the failure of the DOJ antibargaining policy 
underscore a significant but often-ignored difference between the two 
major theories of criminal law, utilitarianism and retributivism.5 The 
policy reflected the aspirations of a retributive-justice agenda, seeking fair, 
uniform, and deserved punishment for all offenders. Yet the policy also 
reflected the limitations of such an agenda, highlighting its restricted scope 
relative to that of the rival utilitarian theory. In a meaningful way, 
utilitarianism provides a complete theory of criminal justice, while 
retributivism apparently does not. 
Utilitarianism, which bases punishment on the forward-looking goal of 
preventing future crime, is not only a justificatory theory explaining why 
 
 
 4. As Marc Miller pointed out at the time, the Ashcroft memo had more bark than bite, as its 
policies failed to “confront the major issues that control charging and screening decisions, including 
the wise use of prosecutorial resources (or in a more negative light, the need for triage) . . . .” Marc L. 
Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1257 
(2004). Miller concluded: “Even if every line lawyer takes the 2003 policies to heart (a practical 
impossibility), or applies them aggressively but only fully to address plea bargains (more plausibly), 
the tough-sounding 2003 policies include exceptions that any wise prosecutor (and there are many 
wise prosecutors) could drive a truck through.” Id. 
 5. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 2.03 (4th ed. 2006) 
(describing utilitarianism and retributivism); Russell L. Christopher, The Prosecutor’s Dilemma: 
Bargains and Punishments, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 98–99 n.19 (2003) (providing support for the 
claim that “[t]he two main justifications of punishment are retributivism and consequentialism”). 
 These are the two “major” or most commonly cited punishment theories, but there are others as 
well: “expressive” theories, “character” (or “virtue ethics,” or “aretaic,” or “Aristotelian”) theories, and 
“restorative justice” theories, among others. See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 267 
(1986) (describing “an ideal account of criminal punishment as a communicative enterprise in which 
we engage with the criminal”); Peter Arenella, Character, Choice and Moral Agency: The Relevance 
of Character to Our Moral Culpability Judgments, in CRIME, CULPABILITY, AND REMEDY 59 (Ellen 
Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1990) (focusing on the relevance of character to criminal law); John 
Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian?, 46 UCLA L. REV. 
1727 (1999) (discussing a “restorative justice” model of criminal law); Kyron Huigens, Virtue and 
Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423 (1995) (describing an aretaic or virtue-based conception of 
criminal responsibility); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
591 (1996) (offering an “expressivist” view focusing on punishment as societal expression of 
condemnation). The existence of these other theories does not affect my analysis of retributivism, 
although that analysis may well apply to some of these other theories as well. 
 Further, it is significant to note that terms such as utilitarianism and retributivism do not (without 
further elaboration) describe full-fledged theories of punishment but rather mere aspects of a theory. 
See Kyron Huigens, On Commonplace Punishment Theory, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 437, 439–44. For 
example, deterrence and retribution may be aims of (or possible justifications for) punishment, but 
specifying the end(s) is merely one aspect of a theory. See id. In a sense, this article’s claim is that a 
commitment to utilitarian ends can guide or at least imply the choice of means, and accordingly can 
form the basis of a fully developed theory more easily than a commitment to retributivist ends. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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criminal punishment should exist, but also a prescriptive theory explaining 
how punishment institutions should work. The utilitarian agenda 
encompasses both the purposes and the practices of the criminal justice 
system, seeking in all cases and at all stages of the process to minimize or 
prevent social harms (in the most cost-effective way).6 Because its project 
aims to specify both the content of criminal law and the proper means for 
enforcing that law, utilitarianism is not only a theory of punishment, but a 
complete theory of criminal justice.7 
By contrast, retributivism, which adopts a backward-looking 
perspective focusing on the moral duty to punish past wrongdoing, is a 
justificatory theory, but seemingly not a prescriptive one.8 It offers 
retribution as a justifying ideal but does not explain how legal institutions 
are supposed to make retribution real.9 To the extent retributivism offers 
guidance about its own operation in practice, it speaks only to the content 
of criminal law rules, and not to their implementation.10 Retributive 
 
 
 6. See, e.g., Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Mediating Rules in Criminal Law, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 1197, 1210 (2007) (“In contrast to retributivism, [utilitarian] deterrence is system-focused. 
Deterrence gauges the appropriateness of criminal liability and punishment by reference to the social 
costs of wrongful conduct and the social costs of measures necessary to prevent it. Harmful conduct 
should be criminalized and punished whenever doing so is the most cost-effective way to 
disincentivize that conduct.”). 
 7. See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 310 n.35 (2002). 
 8. Indeed, even as a justificatory theory, retributivism may serve only a narrow function. 
According to one recent account, for example, retributivism does not provide an affirmative general 
basis for punishing but merely counters a particular objection to the imposition of punishment—
namely, that it inflicts suffering. See Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment and Justification, 118 ETHICS 
(forthcoming Jan. 2008) (manuscript at 23, on file with author) (“Retributivists take themselves to be 
offering a tailored justification for punishment—tailored to the demand basis that punishment inflicts 
suffering. Unless they become persuaded that they must offer something more, the proposition that 
[retributivism] cannot establish that it is permissible all things considered for the state to inflict the 
deserved punishment looks more like an observation [retributivists] are permitted to accept than an 
objection to which they need respond.”); see also id. at 50 (“A sympathetic or charitable understanding 
of contemporary retributivism requires one to recognize that its proponents are rarely purporting to 
provide an all-things-considered justification of punishment. More often, they are offering a tailored 
justification against the fact that punishment inflicts suffering . . . .”). 
 9. Cf. Kenneth L. Avio, Economic, Retributive and Contractarian Conceptions of Punishment, 
12 LAW & PHIL. 249, 263 (1993) (“[R]etributivist explanations . . . fail to indicate how many resources 
should be devoted to criminal justice, and how to allocate these resources between apprehension and 
punishment.”); Mark D. White, Retributivism in a World of Scarcity, in THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Mark D. White ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming 2009) (manuscript 
at 2, on file with author) (“[R]etributivism does not take costs or resource constraints into account 
when it requires universal just punishments, so there is no room for optimization or trade-offs within 
its boundaries.”). 
 10. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 308–11 (criticizing retributive theory for its 
asserted failure to address practical enforcement issues of error and resource constraints); cf. 
Bierschbach & Stein, supra note 6, at 1206 (2007) (“For the retributivist, substantive rules and 
sanctioning rules are—or at least should be—generally more important than evidentiary rules.”). 
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principles may identify what the law should criminalize,11 and might even 
say something about the proper idealized level of punishment for those 
crimes relative to each other.12 As to matters of application, however, 
retributivists tend to focus only on the resolution of individual (often 
hypothetical) cases where an offender’s behavior is known or stipulated.13 
 
 
 11. Some critics of retributivism question whether it can do even this much; some supporters 
claim it does not purport that it can do even this much. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 303 
(pointing out that retributive “theory does not include a definition of what constitutes wrongful 
behavior deserving punishment”); id. at 304 n.24 (“That the retributive theory does not state a 
definition of wrongfulness deserving of punishment, and is therefore incomplete, is frequently noted.” 
(citing JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 36 (1990) (claiming retributive theory does “not offer guidance on what is to be 
criminalized”))); see also Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1434 (2004) (“[T]here 
is no specifically retributivist contribution to the determination of what kind of behavior ought to be 
the subject of criminal legislation. The subject of criminal legislation is one that philosophers, 
economists, and judges dispute . . . but it is not one in which retributivists have a stake as retributivists 
. . . .”); cf. Mitchell N. Berman, On the Moral Structure of White Collar Crime, 5 OHIO. ST. J. CRIM. L. 
301, 301–02, 326–27 (2007) (describing reasons for enacting legal rules that do not precisely track the 
contours of moral norms, and stating that legal theorists “will see farther if they more fully appreciate 
the extent to which the problem of legal drafting departs from the problem of identifying the 
underlying moral wrong that the law might be intended in the first instance to capture”). 
 Even if the retributivist project is limited to justifying punishment rather than articulating what is 
supposed to be punished, retributivism does offer a basic criterion—moral wrongfulness—by which it 
is possible to assess whether criminalizing any particular conduct is prima facie acceptable. Notably, 
to the extent that (as the above critiques claim) even a strongly retributive substantive criminal law 
must inevitably take account of factors other than moral wrongfulness, this suggests that the 
consequentialist-retributivist approach I endorse in this article might be useful or even necessary at the 
stage of formulating, as well as implementing, criminal law. See infra Part II.C (discussing the impact 
of real-world concerns on the legislature, even if the legislature pursues a retributive agenda); Part 
III.C (defending consequentialist retributivism and noting its possible implications for the substance of 
criminal rules). 
 12. The extent to which retributive theory can do this is debated. Compare, e.g., ANDREW VON 
HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF 
CRIMINALS 63–76 (1985) (claiming potential to identify the relative severity of different offenses with 
reasonable precision), with David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 
1636–42 (1992) (critiquing work seeking to determine the proportionate level of punishment that 
different offenses deserve). 
 Theoretical matters aside, some empirical work asserts that lay intuitions about deserved 
punishment show fairly wide consensus regarding the relative seriousness of different offenses. See, 
e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS 
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995); Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in 
Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829 (2007). 
 13. Cf. Douglas Husak, What Moral Philosophers Might Learn from Criminal Theorists, 36 
RUTGERS L.J. 191, 192 (2004) (“Moral philosophers and criminal theorists tend to employ a similar 
methodology in deciding whether a given principle or doctrine is fair, just, or reasonable. . . . They 
frequently begin by describing examples, and ask how the behavior of the persons in these cases 
should be assessed. Answers or intuitions are thought to provide good reason to prefer one principle 
rather than another; they function as data that competing doctrines must struggle to accommodate.”); 
Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice, 2003 
UTAH L. REV. 205, 206 (discussing the problems with “use of dubious arguments by punishment 
theorists and critics, employing surreal hypotheticals that have little resonance in perceived reality”); 
Paul H. Robinson, The Role of Moral Philosophers in the Competition Between Deontological and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Their theories offer no clear guidance as to more general issues of 
implementation in a system bound by resource constraints, imperfect 
information, and other limitations. They do not tell underfunded police 
and overworked prosecutors how to prioritize, or when, if ever, to 
compromise. If all offenders cannot be caught, how should the police set 
priorities in their enforcement agenda? Can, or should, prosecutors enter 
into plea bargains or give one offender less (or no) punishment for the 
sake of convicting another? Retributivism offers no obvious answers to 
these questions, or else seems to give unrealistic answers. Hence the 
failure of the Ashcroft policy, which shared retributive theory’s focus on 
desert but also its myopia regarding practical constraints. 
This Article seeks to determine whether any retributive theory can do 
any better than Ashcroft’s memorandum in setting a feasible law 
enforcement agenda. Can a retributivist theory of punishment be 
translated, or fleshed out, into a complete theory of criminal justice—what 
this Article will call a theory of real-world retribution? (This Article will 
refer to such a theory as a “retributive” theory or a theory of retribution 
rather than a “retributivist” theory, as some might contend that 
retributivism per se properly should be viewed as a theory of punishment 
only. I make no claim that retributivists must expand their theory into 
some version of real-world retribution; the claim is merely that failure to 
do so limits the reach of retributivism as a theory.) 
Such a theory would have to address two related aspects of the 
practical application of its substantive moral commitments.14 First, the 
 
 
Empirical Desert, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831, 1839 (2007) (“A standard analytic form, if not the 
standard form, among moral philosophers today is to use hypotheticals and philosophers’ own 
intuitions about the proper resolution of the hypothetical as a basis for building moral principles.”). 
 14. The application of a retributive-justice scheme might give rise not only to the practical 
concerns this Article addresses but also to conflicts between retribution and other principled 
commitments. For example, a commitment to certain aspects of procedural justice or fairness may 
sometimes frustrate the system’s ability to impose punishment on those who deserve it. I, and others, 
have discussed elsewhere the relation between desert-based punishment and these other rules or 
principles. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY CRIMINAL 
LAW DOESN’T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE 137–85 (2006) (discussing procedural rules that 
may conflict with desert); see also MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 739–95 (1997) (discussing limits liberal political theory might place on the reach of 
retributive criminal law); Bierschbach & Stein, supra note 6, at 1206–09 (discussing relationship 
between retributivism and evidentiary rules). 
 Ultimately, resolution of such conflicts between principled commitments depends on some 
decision about which principle merits priority in the abstract. This Article does not focus on such 
conflicts at the level of choosing among principles but on another set of issues: Presupposing some 
level of commitment to retributive justice, could even an adherent of retribution offer practical 
guidance about how to enforce its commands? And if so, what would that guidance look like? These 
issues would arise even if retributive justice were the only goal of the criminal system, for even then, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss4/3
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theory must offer guidance not only to the legislature charged with 
enacting criminal law, but also to the government officials—police and 
prosecutors—charged with enforcing that law.15 A complete theory of 
justice should recognize, consider the relations between, and offer 
guidance to all of the players and institutions that comprise the legal 
system.16 
Second, a real-world retribution theory must confront the scarcity of 
resources. Any justice system operates on a limited budget. Accordingly, 
any such system faces constraints in its ability to catch, prosecute, and 
punish all criminals.17 Any theory that expects to make retribution real 
should have the capacity to explain how the system should set priorities 
within and between these tasks.18 
If retributivism says nothing about how to make retribution real, it is 
incomplete as a theory of justice or of criminal law. A defense of 
retribution as a moral principle is not the same as a model of retributive 
justice, for it does not tell us how—or, perhaps, even whether—actual 
legal institutions should go about the task of imposing punishment that is 
morally deserved in the abstract.19 Such a theory provides a moral 
philosophy but not a legal system. 
 
 
resource and informational constraints would inevitably deny the system the ability to identify, 
prosecute, and punish all offenders. 
 15. The theory must also instruct the judges and juries who interpret the law, but because those 
actors exercise their authority case by case, any real-world retribution theory would presumably tell 
them to “do justice” in each case—i.e., to ensure, within the confines of their discretion, that each 
defendant is punished in accordance with his or her desert. Retributivism’s lacuna is its failure to guide 
the enforcement authorities who have the power (and responsibility) to determine which cases are 
pursued to the fullest extent, which are subject to compromise, and which are dropped entirely. 
 16. As Michael Moore has put it, retributive justice is “not a role-specific” basis of punishment, 
but rather one that applies to judges as well as to legislators. MOORE, supra note 14, at 71. 
Presumably, it should apply to police and prosecutors as well. This Article seeks to explore the 
guidance that a retributive model (or different possible retributive models) would or could offer these 
other players. Cf. id. at 150 (referring to necessary transition “from moral theory to the political theory 
needed to justify the setting up of institutions” designed to achieve principled goals). 
 17. For an example of how law enforcement officials acknowledge resource constraints and the 
need to prioritize which aspects of their mission to pursue, see generally FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, STRATEGIC PLAN 2004–2009, available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/ 
strategicplan/strategicplanfull.pdf. 
 18. For another recent effort to elaborate and evaluate possible ways to apply retributive 
principles in a world of limited resources, see generally White, supra note 9. 
 19. See Douglas Husak, Holistic Retributivism, 88 CAL. L. REV. 991, 996 (2000) (“[T]he 
demonstration that some good is produced by giving persons what they deserve does not suffice to 
justify the institution of punishment—even for retributivists. . . . Retributivists must show not only that 
giving culpable wrongdoers what they deserve is intrinsically valuable, but also that it is sufficiently 
valuable to offset . . . the drawbacks of punishment—negative values that inevitably are produced 
when an institution of punishment is created.”); cf. Guyora Binder, Punishment Theory: Moral or 
Political?, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 321, 321–22 (2002) (“Because punishment is part of a system of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Such incompleteness is not only problematic as a matter of theoretical 
nicety but presents serious moral and practical concerns for anyone 
committed to the principle of punishment according to desert. In the 
absence of any well-developed explanation of how best to pursue 
retributive goals in a world of limited resources, law enforcers are left with 
two options that any committed retributivist should find highly 
problematic: either rely on post hoc (and ad hoc) case-by-case 
enforcement discretion, or else simply give up on desert-based punishment 
and adopt an explicitly utilitarian agenda.20 Accordingly, the project of 
setting out a consistent and principled scheme for making retribution real 
would appear to have significant value. 
Unfortunately, deriving a set of real-world enforcement priorities from 
retributive theory is no easy task. Indeed, retributivism’s orientation as a 
justificatory theory seems to undermine, or at least complicate, its own 
capacity to offer prescriptive guidance. Retributive theorists often justify 
punishment by reference to the moral duty (not just the authority) to 
punish those who deserve it.21 That understanding of punishment as an 
unwavering obligation indicates that the retributivist perspective does not 
lend itself to the practical compromises often necessary in the real world, 
where we cannot punish all wrongdoers to the full extent of their moral 
desert. 
This Article explores possible ways to flesh out a retributive theory of 
punishment that might, at least in principle, offer guidance to real-world 
decisionmakers about how to enforce criminal law, as well as how to write 
it. The present project does not aim to provide a solution for every specific 
situation these decisionmakers might confront. Rather, the task here is to 
ask whether a real-world retribution theory is even possible, to determine 
what general approaches such a theory might prescribe, and to evaluate 
those approaches in terms of their general practical ramifications. At the 
very least, it is a call to retributive theorists to pay more attention to real-
world implementation issues. One would think that such theorists would 
be eager to improve the potential to realize retributive principles by 
offering guidance to all relevant players in the criminal justice system, 
 
 
institutional authority, it is not amenable to a simple moral analysis.”); id. at 333 (“[I]t makes more 
sense to think of the justification of punishment as a problem of political theory than as a problem of 
ethics.”). 
 20. See, e.g., White, supra note 9, at 21 (“While retributivism is strictly a theory of punishment, 
few retributivists would be comfortable with wide latitude and discretion on the part of prosecutors, 
and most may endorse the extension of justice-based constraints to the actions of prosecutors as 
well.”). 
 21. See sources cited infra Part I.A. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss4/3
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rather than leaving critical matters of implementation unexplored and 
unexplained, thereby essentially surrendering a great deal of ground at the 
outset. 
In some respects, then, this Article is strongly critical of retributivism, 
since the Article’s premise is that retributivist theory, as typically 
formulated and advanced, is unsatisfying or incomplete. At the same time, 
the Article is fundamentally sympathetic to the retributivist agenda, as it 
assumes that the principle of desert-based punishment22 merits at least 
some presumptive respect.23 I point to three sources for evidence of the 
significance of retributive justice. First, though perhaps least important, is 
the vast scholarly literature advancing and defending retributive theory. As 
between retributive and utilitarian perspectives, retributivism is often 
recognized as occupying the dominant position, at least within the 
scholarly literature, over the last several decades.24 Second, philosophers 
are not the only ones who value retributive justice; empirical studies 
indicate that most people consider desert-based punishment to be the 
fundamental goal of criminal law and intuitively respond to actual cases in 
desert-based terms.25 Finally, at least some degree of commitment to a 
 
 
 22. This Article refers interchangeably to “retributive” punishment and “desert-based” 
punishment. It is reasonably common for commentators to equate the two terms in such fashion, 
though some take issue with this. See Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the 
Commutation of Death Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 
426–27 (noting but criticizing the typical understanding of retribution as grounded in moral desert). 
 23. See Lawrence H. Davis, They Deserve to Suffer, 32 ANALYSIS 136, 139 (1972) (concluding it 
“very likely” that imposing deserved punishment has value “on the grounds (a) that there is no 
convincing argument against it, and (b) that inclination to believe it seems very widespread among the 
people whose moral intuitions constitute the main data we have for settling questions of value”). 
 One who attaches no value to the pursuit of retributive justice would obviously see nothing 
worthwhile in an effort to present a scheme for pursuing it effectively. For example, committed 
utilitarians enjoy deriding retributivism’s lack of practicality, but they make no attempt to explain 
whether or how the theory could be made more practical since they have no interest in making it so. 
See generally, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 308–11, 326–29, 339–41 (critiquing the 
practical shortcomings of theoretical retributivist literature for the sake of advancing the authors’ 
welfarist project). 
 24. See MOORE, supra note 14, at 83 & n.1 (noting, and citing authorities supporting, 
retributivism’s “resurgence among the legal theorists of the past thirty years”); Christopher, supra note 
5, at 97 n.13 (collecting authorities referring to retributivism as the dominant contemporary 
justification of punishment). 
 25. Studies indicate that the typical person’s reaction to criminal cases is driven more by desert-
based considerations than by utilitarian considerations. See, e.g., Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why Do 
We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 284 (2002) (empirical study suggesting that laypersons consider neither difficulty of 
detection nor publicity—classic deterrence factors—in setting punishment); John M. Darley et al., 
Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 659 (2000) 
(empirical study suggesting that, in setting punishment, laypersons emphasize culpability over the 
correlation to future criminality, especially when protective mechanisms other than the criminal justice 
system are available); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL 
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notion of desert or moral blame is almost universally evident within the 
history and traditions of actual criminal systems.26 
Part I of this Article looks to retributive theory to see what it says or 
suggests about how to enforce the law, either in terms of imposing 
constraints (telling officials what they may not do) or offering affirmative 
guidance (telling officials what they should do). Different versions of 
retributive thinking imply different options or mandates for law 
enforcement. Canvassing and generalizing from the literature, Part I 
describes three possible implementation approaches that a legitimately 
retribution-oriented theory might adopt. Part I also considers the position 
that retributivism simply has nothing to say about enforcement, and notes 
two possible approaches grounded in that position. 
Part II discusses in more detail what a real-world retribution scheme 
might look like under each of the three versions of a retribution-based 
criminal justice theory sketched in Part I. The discussion explores what 
practices each theory might endorse or prohibit for police and prosecutors 
seeking to do justice as best they can. In doing so, Part II raises practical 
considerations and undesirable potential consequences that might 
complicate, or militate against, the implementation of these general 
options. 
Part III evaluates the options for real-world retribution, both 
conceptually and practically, in light of the obstacles and drawbacks that 
 
 
STUD. 237 (2000) (discussing two reported experiments suggesting that people do not spontaneously 
think in terms of optimal deterrence, and that people would have objections to policies based on the 
goal of optimal deterrence); Mark Warr & Mark Stafford, Public Goals of Punishment and Support for 
the Death Penalty, 21 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 95, 99–101 (1984) (describing citizens’ identification 
of retribution as the goal that should govern the criminal justice system). 
 For good or ill, such retributive judgments of blameworthiness may be natural, and perhaps even 
inevitable, based on human biology. Cf. J.L. Mackie, Morality and the Retributive Emotions, 1 CRIM. 
JUST. ETHICS 3 (1982) (pointing to biological bases for moral intuitions about retribution); Lawrence 
M. Solan, Cognitive Foundations of the Impulse to Blame, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1003 (2003) (discussing 
features of human psychology contributing to our natural tendency to impose moral judgments of 
blame). 
 Some studies also suggest that people value achieving a desert-based result more highly than they 
value procedural fairness. See, e.g., Linda J. Skitka & David A. Houston, When Due Process Is of No 
Consequence: Moral Mandates and Presumed Defendant Guilt or Innocence, 14 SOC. JUST. RES. 305 
(2001); see also Linda J. Skitka, Do the Means Always Justify the Ends, or Do the Ends Sometimes 
Justify the Means? A Value Protection Model of Justice Reasoning, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 588 (2002); Linda J. Skitka & Elizabeth Mullen, The Dark Side of Moral Conviction, 
2 ANALYSES OF SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 35 (2002); Linda J. Skitka & Elizabeth Mullen, 
Understanding Judgments of Fairness in a Real-World Political Context: A Test of the Value 
Protection Model of Justice Reasoning, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1419 (2002). 
 26. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. 
L. REV. 201 (1996) (noting that all, or nearly all, legal systems appear to recognize the distinction 
between civil and criminal law and  see the latter as uniquely concerned with moral condemnation). 
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surface in Part II. The Article concludes that only one option seems to 
offer a genuine and (relatively) workable vision of how to implement 
retributive justice in the real world. That approach, “consequentialist 
retributivism” (CR), would view retributive punishment as a goal to 
maximize rather than a categorical ex ante commitment, as other 
approaches would have it. Interestingly, though the CR approach has 
considerable intuitive appeal in this context, it has thus far apparently 
received no explicit, sustained defense in the scholarly literature. One 
significant contribution this Article seeks to make is to provide such a 
defense of the CR approach, which might be the only version of retributive 
justice possible, or at least worth pursuing, in the real world. 
I. SURVEYING THE OPTIONS 
Retributive theorists tend to say little about matters of implementation, 
but one can make some inferences about the application of retributive 
principles to law enforcement authorities based on what the theorists say 
about retribution’s general demands. These discussions imply at least five 
possible views on how to apply retributive justice in real-world cases: 
three variations involve how such an application might or should be done, 
and two variations involve how it cannot or should not be done. This Part 
first discusses the three views that allow for some form of real-world 
retribution scheme, in order of decreasing strictness (i.e., starting with the 
view under which retributive demands place the most severe restrictions 
on the options available to officials). The options are as follows: (1) 
retributive justice imposes a moral duty to punish all (identified) offenders 
to the full extent their moral desert demands, with no exceptions;27 (2) the 
same offender-specific duty exists as in (1), but some exceptions are 
allowed;28 and (3) the duty to punish does not demand punishment in 
every particular case but instead imposes a general obligation to maximize 
the overall amount of (deserved) punishment imposed.29 
It is also possible that, in the end, retributivism is only a justificatory 
theory and not a prescriptive one (nor capable of being developed into or 
forming the basis of a prescriptive one). If so, at least two interpretations 
of that conclusion are possible, offering two additional visions of the 
relation between retributivism and the real world. The first interpretation, 
which itself might generate two distinct prescriptions for law enforcement, 
 
 
 27.  See infra Part I.A. 
 28.  See infra Part I.B. 
 29.  See infra Part I.C. 
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is that (4) retributivism makes no demands regarding implementation, so 
officials should either (4a) pursue an explicitly utilitarian agenda, or (4b) 
do whatever they think is best (perhaps applying one of the three 
putatively retribution-oriented models above, or perhaps simply using their 
discretion ad hoc to resolve individual cases or respond to enforcement 
situations as they arise). The second interpretation is that (5) retributivism 
offers no guidance about implementation, so it is altogether useless or 
inappropriate as an influence on any aspect of criminal law, including 
substantive law; in other words, retributivism and the real world are 
incompatible, so the real world wins.30 
This Part sets out, in turn, each of the five possible positions described 
above and surveys the available literature for examples of thinkers who 
either explicitly adopt that view, tacitly hint at it, or describe it as a 
plausible version (or extension) of retributivism while declining to support 
it.  
A. The Absolutist Model: Avoid All Failures of Desert 
The strictest version of retributivism sees its moral rules as clear and 
absolute mandates applying to each person in all situations. Such moral 
rules would include not only the imperatives captured by criminal law 
itself but also, and significantly for this discussion, the moral duty to 
punish all those (and only those) who deserve punishment. Because this 
version is rooted in a priori moral commitments, it is often described as a 
deontological understanding; because its commands apply to each 
individual actor and action, rather than seeking to maximize “the good” 
overall or in the long run, it is sometimes described as an agent-relative 
approach.31 
Retributivist literature is rife with references to the principle of desert-
based punishment as a moral duty and to the corresponding claim that the 
retributive principle does not merely authorize punishment but 
affirmatively calls for its imposition on those who deserve it.32 The view 
 
 
 30. This is not to say that all retributive thinkers, if forced to decide between the two, would 
necessarily choose the real world over the theory. 
 31. See MOORE, supra note 14, at 156 (“The ‘deontological’ or ‘agent-relative’ retributivist 
regards the act of punishing the guilty as categorically demanded on each occasion, considered 
separately.”). 
 32. A similar claim, or perhaps the same one in different dress, asserts that imposition of 
deserved punishment is not merely a typical policy objective but a dictate of (retributive) justice, 
making its pursuit obligatory in a way that pursuit of other goals or goods is not. See Berman, supra 
note 8, at 28 (“Those who doubt that the good of a wrongdoer suffering (on account of and in 
proportion to his blameworthy wrongdoing) provides a reason of sufficient weight, or of the right sort, 
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dates back at least as far as Kant33 and Hegel,34 and it continues to appear 
in contemporary writing as well.35 Indeed, some version of this claim 
 
 
to render permissible the [imposition of punishment] might think otherwise once justice is introduced 
as a mediating norm or value. Retributivists can now argue that a wrongdoer’s suffering is demanded 
by justice, and therefore that what provides reason of sufficient weight to justify [punishment] is (at 
least in part) the state’s obligation to see that justice is done.”). 
 33. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 105 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797) (describing retributive punishment as a “categorical imperative” 
that “must always be inflicted upon [a criminal] only because he has committed a crime”); id. at 109–
10 (asserting that “failure to punish . . . is the greatest wrong” a state can inflict against its citizens). 
 34. See G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 127 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. 
Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821) (“Both the nature of crime and the criminal’s own 
will require that the infringement for which he is responsible should be cancelled.”); see also IGOR 
PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 74 (1997) (“A full-fledged retributive theory sees in the 
offense committed not only the ground of the right to punish, but the source of the duty to punish as 
well. In this respect, Hegel is a true retributivist: his doctrine . . . is primarily an attempt to establish 
the second of the two claims.”). 
 35. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Is It Wrong to Commute Death Row? Retribution, Atonement, 
and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1319, 1324 (2004) (“Retributive justice obligates the state to punish an 
offender because and to the extent, but only to the extent, he deserves to be punished. . . . [T]he state 
cannot shirk its obligation to do justice.”); see also infra note 42 (citing Michael Moore’s references to 
duty to punish). 
 The extent to which contemporary retributivist thinkers continue to adhere to the classic absolutist 
position is unclear. Some recent general ascriptions of the absolutist position to retributivist thinking 
come from critics who seek to point out its difficulties. See, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 7, 
at 295 n.9 (referring to, and providing citations to support, the “standard retributive view under which 
wrongdoers should be punished”); id. at 297 n.12 (providing additional references to twentieth-century 
retributivist literature); Christopher, supra note 5, at 125–26 (discussing and supporting claim that 
“[o]ne of retributivism’s most important principles is the duty to punish culpable wrongdoers”). Such 
critics may be connecting retributivism with absolutism for the sake of lampooning retributivism more 
easily. 
 Other references to the absolutist duty to punish appear within general summaries of the 
retributivist position, which are not always put forth by scholars who are themselves retributivists. See, 
e.g., PRIMORATZ, supra note 34, at 148 (“The offense committed is the sole ground of the state’s right 
and duty to punish . . . . ‘Justice’ and ‘just deserts’ are not meant merely negatively, as constraints, but 
also positively, as demands for punishment of the guilty and the full measure of proportion between 
the punishment and the offense.”); Stanley I. Benn, Punishment, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
29, 30 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967) (“The most thoroughgoing retributivists . . . maintain that the 
punishment of crime is right in itself, that it is fitting that the guilty should suffer, and that justice, or 
the moral order, requires the institution of punishment.”); Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 4 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1336, 1338 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) (describing 
retributive justification as holding that “[s]ociety not only has a right to punish a person who deserves 
punishment, but it has a duty to do so”). 
 Accordingly, the absolutist view may be more a relic of intellectual history than a centerpiece of 
modern retributivist thought. Even if that is true, discussion of this version of the retributivist position 
remains useful for two reasons. First, in this context, situating absolutism within a broader array of 
genuinely retributive models makes clear that the absolutist position describes just one version of 
retributivism rather than the whole of it, thereby defusing some of the antiretributivists’ general attack 
even while agreeing with its validity as to this particular vision of retributive justice. 
 Second, although explicit endorsement of the absolutist position within retributivist commentary 
seems increasingly uncommon, many retributivist writers do not explicitly endorse any other view 
either. Although some contemporary retributivist writers have directly, and laudably, confronted the 
fundamental nature of the retributivist commitment—and this Article tries to incorporate and advance 
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seems necessary to a retributivist justification of punishment, as the 
weaker claim that wrongdoing only permits but does not demand 
punishment—which also surfaces in the literature at times36—would not 
suffice to justify punishment, for many practices may be permissible 
without being desirable (much less required).37 
In theory, the duty-to-punish view creates a clear affirmative goal for 
the application of the retributive principle: punish everybody who deserves 
it, to the full extent of their desert. In practice, however, limitations of 
resources, evidence, and knowledge make this goal impossible to achieve. 
Even if we wanted to punish every wrongdoer or offender, we could not 
find them all or muster sufficient proof of their crimes. 
 
 
their work—others take that commitment as given and spend their time analyzing the nature and 
demands of moral desert in specific situations. If nothing else, this Article might encourage such 
retributive thinkers to reflect on the nature of their commitment to the retributive principle and the 
extent to which different understandings of that commitment might bear on the formulation or 
application of retributive rules in particular contexts. 
 36. See, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 295 n.9 (noting and citing sources for the 
alternative view “that holds only that punishment of wrongdoers is permissible”—though questioning, 
in some cases, whether ascription of this view to the relevant commentators is accurate). 
 37. See id. (noting that a theory of retribution as allowing but not requiring punishment “must be 
complemented by another theory that indicates when punishment that is permissible should in fact be 
meted out; ordinarily, it seems to be understood that some form of consequentialist theory would be 
employed to do so”); cf. J.L. Mackie, Retributivism: A Test Case for Ethical Objectivity, in 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 677, 678 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 4th ed. 1991) [hereinafter 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW] (noting that “negative” retributive claims about avoiding punishment of the 
innocent, as opposed to accounts of retribution as an affirmative basis for punishing, “take us no 
distance at all towards a positive reason for punishing the guilty just because they are guilty”). 
 Mitchell Berman offers a distinct account of retributivism whose ultimate effect is similar—i.e., 
defending the acceptability of punishment without offering an affirmative basis for imposing it. 
Berman contends that retributivism provides a (partial) justification of punishment—not by defining a 
moral duty, but rather by offering a “cancelling condition” that negates a particular objection to 
punishment (namely, that it inflicts suffering). See Berman, supra note 8, at 10–11 (describing the 
notion of a cancelling condition, which Berman borrows from the work of Joseph Raz); id. at 42–43 
(summarizing position that retributivism offers partial justification for punishment and does so by 
cancellation). Accordingly, retributivism, standing alone, does not necessarily provide a basis for 
imposing punishment in the face of other objections (such as its cost)—though, somewhat in keeping 
with the CR perspective, Berman points out that the good of achieving desert can be one consideration 
within a broader consequentialist analysis of punishment’s costs and benefits. See id. at 51 
(“[R]etributivism lacks the resources to provide . . . even a tailored justification for peripheral cases of 
punishment—those in which the imposition of punishment rests on a mistake regarding the 
defendant’s responsibility for the offense. So if peripheral cases are to be justified against the fact that 
punishment inflicts suffering, and if punishment simpliciter is to be justified all-things-considered, 
then consequentialist considerations must be relied upon.”); id. at 41–42 (noting that “good 
consequences can include (what I have supposed to be) the good of bringing about a state of affairs in 
which deserved suffering obtains”). 
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Theorists rarely confront this problem head-on or describe how best to 
pursue the retributive obligation in practice,38 so any effort to flesh out the 
theory in this regard involves some extrapolation. In its application, an 
absolutist deontological version of retributivism does not provide a 
positive objective so much as a negative injunction or constraint: where 
(we know39) an identifiable person deserves punishment, we are obliged to 
punish that person.40 At the same time, we are obliged not to punish a 
person where (we know) she deserves no punishment, or where (we know) 
the punishment exceeds what she does deserve.41 
The general orientation of this version is a concern with punishing 
individual offenders (as opposed to offenses). Because it sees the duty to 
punish as categorical, this vision does not offer a clear means for 
prioritizing punishment of more serious offenses over less serious ones—
the amount of punishment would vary according to desert, but the duty to 
punish would presumably apply with equal force in all cases. For example, 
although a murderer would ultimately receive more punishment than a 
shoplifter based on their relative blameworthiness, the categorical duty to 
impose punishment in all cases of blameworthy wrongdoing would 
seemingly exist as to both in equal measure. 
 
 
 38. See, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 308B10 (pointing to real-world problems of 
adjudicative error and resource limitations and criticizing retributive theory for failing to address these 
issues). 
 39. Here, and in the following textual sentence, I place the phrase “we know” in parentheses 
because here, as generally with retributivist rules, there is some question as to what kind of mental 
state or level of awareness would suffice to make one’s breach of a duty morally culpable, therefore 
itself wrongful. Punishing an innocent person on purpose would clearly be forbidden; doing so by 
accident might be improper or unfortunate but would not be morally blameworthy. This issue is 
relevant to the more concrete question of what safeguards an actual criminal justice system would have 
to erect, or what kinds of behavior an individual official may or must perform or avoid, to satisfy the 
demands of the deontological view. See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing debate as to whether absolutist 
deontology even permits the formation of punishment institutions, given that some errors are bound to 
occur). 
 40. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 51, 61 (1999) (“Kant’s intuition represents a fundamental plank in the tradition of 
retributive justice. The reason we must punish is to avoid liability for impunidad—for allowing 
criminals to go [un]punished.”); see also id. at 62 (noting that the obligation to punish all offenders—
to avoid systemic complicity in the evil of “impunidad”—arises only after institutions of punishment 
have been developed, and relates to their implementation). 
 41. Even “weak” or “negative” retributive theories, which do not claim an affirmative duty to 
punish the deserving, recognize an obligation not to punish the innocent, and not to punish beyond 
what is deserved. See supra notes 36–37 (referring to such theories and the sources discussing them); 
Mackie, supra note 37, at 678 (“Negative retributivism (for which ‘minimalism’ may be another 
name) holds that those who are not guilty must not . . . be punished, that the absence of a crime 
morally requires the non-infliction of a penalty. There is also a quantitative variant of negative 
retributivism, that even if someone is guilty of a crime it is wrong to punish him more severely than is 
proportional to the crime.”). 
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B. The Threshold Model: Avoid Serious Failures of Desert 
A second version of retributivism shares the first version’s position that 
imposing desert-based punishment is a moral duty, but it considers that 
duty less categorical or universal than the absolutist approach. Under this 
view, sometimes called threshold deontology, moral duties are generally 
binding but may be violated if adherence would lead to some particularly 
bad result.42 As with the absolutist approach, theorists sometimes provide 
tacit rather than overt support for this general view,43 though the threshold 
view does have the explicit support of at least one major retributivist 
thinker: Michael Moore.44 
 
 
 42. See MOORE, supra note 14, at 1568 n.13 (“A ‘threshold’ deontologist refuses to violate a 
categorical norm of morality until not doing so produces sufficient bad consequences as to pass some 
threshold—then, he will override such categorical norms.”). I confess that I am not sure what 
“categorical” is supposed to mean in the preceding quotation, as the whole idea of introducing a 
threshold is that the relevant moral norms are not “categorical,” at least as I understand that term. In 
any event, it is certainly apparent from Moore’s statements elsewhere that, as a threshold deontologist, 
he still takes the duty to punish very seriously. See id. at 91 (“[Moral desert] gives society more than 
merely a right to punish culpable offenders. . . . For a retributivist, the moral responsibility of an 
offender also gives society the duty to punish.”); id. at 154 (“The desert of offenders certainly gives 
[state] officials permission to punish offenders . . . . But retributivism goes further. As a theory of a 
kind of justice, it obligates us to seek retribution through the punishment of the guilty.”); id. at 156 
(“[T]he retributivist regards the punishment of the guilty to be categorically imperative whenever the 
opportunity to give such punishment presents itself.”). 
 43. For example, Igor Primoratz offers the following discussion of the potential for other 
considerations (specifically, mercy) to override the duty to punish: 
Sometimes, when the offense committed is not very grave, and the suffering . . . that would 
be brought about by meting the full measure of deserved punishment would be very, very 
great, the call for mercy will override the duty to punish, and the penalty will be considerably 
reduced. There will also be cases in which the facts calling for mercy will be so weighty . . . 
that the final decision will be a full pardon. 
 [This] view of the duty to punish is actually the dominant one in retributivism. . . . The 
duty is not seen as an absolute one, allowing for no exception and no mitigation, whatever the 
circumstances, but rather as a duty of paramount, but not absolute importance, which 
sometimes gives way to mercy and pardon. 
PRIMORATZ, supra note 34, at 110 (citing, as support for the claim that this view is “dominant,” H.J. 
McCloskey, A Non-Utilitarian Approach to Punishment, in CONTEMPORARY UTILITARIANISM 239, 
255–57 (Michael D. Bayles ed., 1968); Alwynne Smart, Mercy, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 
212, 221–27 (H.B. Acton ed., 1969)). 
 44. See MOORE, supra note 14, at 158 (describing himself as a threshold deontologist); id. at 
719–24 (sketching and giving support for threshold version of deontology). But cf. infra notes 146–49 
(discussing Moore’s recent support for a consequentialist perspective as to the general design of 
criminal-justice institutions). 
 Other theorists, dealing with matters other than criminal law specifically, have also implied their 
support for the threshold-deontologist view. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 10 (1978); 
THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 53–74 (1979); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND 
UTOPIA 30 n.* (1974). 
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The very task of setting, or admitting the possibility of, a threshold 
suggests that this model finds the duty to impose desert-based punishment 
to vary in its binding effect. Typically, retributive concerns will outweigh 
other (i.e., consequentialist) considerations, but as the relevant bad 
consequences of following the desert principle become serious enough, 
they may trump retribution. Moore’s discussion of this dynamic looks 
primarily at the situation where retributive goals mandate refraining from 
punishment, but the good consequences that would follow from 
punishment are large enough to outweigh the desert principle. This is 
essentially the “ticking-time-bomb” scenario where torture, which 
retributivism would otherwise prohibit, seems attractive for 
consequentialist reasons.45 
By the same logic, it may also be true that in some cases the retributive 
concerns favor punishment but are small enough that significant 
consequential costs will trump them, militating decisively against 
punishment. Such variations in the level of obligation to punish would 
presumably track the moral gravity of the offense in question: we may 
forgo punishment for less serious crimes, but must punish more serious 
ones.46 Moore himself sometimes hints at this point,47 and on at least one 
occasion explicitly states that a balancing of retribution and other concerns 
might disfavor retributive goals not only because other costs are large, but 
 
 
 45. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 14, at 719 (“It just is not true that one should allow a nuclear 
war rather than killing or torturing an innocent person. It is not even true that one should allow the 
destruction of a sizable city by a terrorist nuclear device rather than kill or torture an innocent 
person.”). The original article in which Moore provides this discussion of threshold deontology was 
written to address the specific question of the permissibility of torture. See Michael S. Moore, Torture 
and the Balance of Evils, 23 ISR. L. REV. 280 (1989). 
 46. Primoratz suggests such a scheme in discussing the scope of retribution as a duty to punish: 
Admittedly, retribution as a positive principle seems to have greater force in cases of more 
serious crimes than in those of petty offenses. In cases of the latter sort we may be more 
inclined to let the offender “get away with it” if no effects of deterrence are to be achieved by 
punishment. If so, we should be able to account for the difference in our moral judgment in 
terms of a general theory of the gravity of offenses which would justify the different 
treatment: a theory which would allow, and even call for, the application of the principle of 
just retribution regarding the most heinous crimes, and others somewhat less abominable, and 
then others less abominable still—and then suspend the principle at a certain point on the 
scale of crimes and replace it by considerations of an entirely different nature: those of 
deterrence. 
PRIMORATZ, supra note 34, at 149. 
 47. Cf. MOORE, supra note 14, at 187 (referring to “the (minor) retributive good of punishing 
minor moral wrongs”); id. at 724 (noting that “where the threshold lies depends in part on the degree 
of wrong done”—though in this context, “wrong” appears to refer to the violation of the retributivist 
principle itself, rather than a wrongful act meriting retributive punishment; whether Moore views the 
two as equivalent is not entirely clear). 
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because the moral wrong in question is “trivial in the degree of [its] 
wrongfulness.”48 
Further, if the relative seriousness of different crimes bears on the 
strength of the duty to punish in this way, presumably that significance 
should hold (at least to some degree) above and below the threshold, rather 
than merely at the threshold point.49 That is, if the duty to punish tracks the 
severity of the wrong, even as to cases that exceed the threshold level and 
warrant punishment, this perspective should endorse prioritizing more 
serious crimes or wrongs over less serious ones. 
To summarize, the threshold deontological view of retribution suggests 
a second possible model of real-world retribution. For the sake of 
convenience, this Article will call it the “threshold model.” An important 
caveat is in order here, however. In part because no one has previously 
elaborated the threshold deontological view along quite these lines, it is 
not clear whether that view would necessarily dictate or even endorse all 
aspects of the “threshold model” presented here.50 In other words, though I 
take the “threshold model” to at least be consistent with threshold 
deontology, my project here is not to provide a scheme that maps precisely 
onto the threshold theory or is implicit in the views of any or all of that 
theory’s adherents.51 Rather, the current aim is merely to offer the model 
as a plausible alternative candidate for advancing some version of 
retributive justice in the real world. 
This second model differs from the absolutist view in two ways. First, 
though it resembles absolutist deontology in recognizing a duty to punish, 
this model allows that in some (presumably rare) cases, other 
considerations could trump that duty and permit a violation of the desert 
 
 
 48. Id. at 663 (“For types of crimes that are relatively trivial in the degree of their wrongfulness, 
such as jaywalking, one might well think that public resources should be better spent on more 
important issues.”). 
 49. Cf. id. at 723 (“[F]or a threshold deontologist consequences always ‘count’. . . . Even before 
[the] threshold was reached, consequences counted but were of insufficient weight to determine the 
rightness of actions.”). 
 50. Of course, the same might also be true for the absolutist and consequentialist models this 
Article sketches, but the risk of mischaracterization seems lower for those two models—for the 
absolutist model, because its moral commitments are so clear, and for the consequentialist model, 
because it apparently has no devotees to offend. 
 51. To note one adherent of the theory in particular, I have pointed to statements or positions 
offered by Michael Moore, a threshold deontologist, as support for the relationship between threshold 
deontology and the threshold model I present. See supra notes 47–49. It is possible, though, that 
Moore does not hold those positions by virtue of his being a threshold deontologist, but rather holds 
them independently of, or in addition to, his commitment to threshold deontology. It is also entirely 
possible that, notwithstanding both his general commitment to threshold deontology and his other 
statements, Moore would completely disavow any support for the “threshold model” this Article 
describes. 
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principle. Thus, where the absolutist model would categorically forbid 
intentional infliction of injury or death on an innocent person under any 
circumstances, the threshold model might allow torturing or even killing if 
doing so would, for example, save an entire city from destruction.52 
Second, this model would appear to scale the magnitude of that duty 
according to the magnitude of the moral wrongdoing involved in an 
offense.53 Unlike the absolutist view that seeks to punish the greatest 
possible number of offenders, then, the threshold view might more 
narrowly target (and demand) punishment of the greatest number of 
serious offenders, with less serious ones receiving lower priority. 
C. Consequentialist Retributivism: Maximize Desert 
A third option abandons the agent-relative view of moral duties and 
adopts an agent-neutral understanding. On this account, the nature of the 
moral call for desert-based punishment does not demand punishment of 
each individual offender but rather sets the goal of maximizing the total 
amount of desert-based punishment,54 even if this means sacrificing 
deserved punishment in some cases for the sake of pursuing it in others. 
Because this approach interprets desert-based punishment as a “good” to 
maximize, rather than an ex ante and inviolate command, it has been 
described as consequentialist (as opposed to deontological) retributivism,55 
which this Article will sometimes abbreviate as “CR.” 
Significantly, the CR perspective does not merely seek to find room for 
retribution as one component of a standard consequentialist scheme, as 
some defenses of desert-based punishment do, for those accounts defend 
the practice as instrumentally valuable insofar as it generates other good 
consequences (such as making people happy or preventing crime).56 The 
 
 
 52. See supra note 45. 
 53. The relative moral gravity of different offenses might turn on various factors, but two 
prominent factors would surely be the level of culpability required (so that intentional wrongdoing 
would be more serious than reckless wrongdoing) and the extent of the harm caused or risked (so that 
causing death would be more serious than causing injury). Other factors or subfactors, such as whether 
harm is actually caused or “merely” risked, might be more controversial in terms of their bearing on 
the seriousness of the offense. 
 54. Obviously, maximizing deserved punishment is distinct from maximizing punishment 
altogether. Any retributivist system would seek to avoid undeserved punishment at least as strenuously 
as it would seek to impose deserved punishment, if not more so. See infra note 87 (discussing the 
relative significance, under a retributivist view, of punishing the guilty versus not punishing the 
innocent). Thus, any undeserved punishment would not only fail to increase the total deserved 
punishment but would reduce the total. 
 55. See MOORE, supra note 14, at 156–59. 
 56. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Fairness of Sanctions: Some 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
834 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:815 
 
 
 
 
CR account holds that imposing deserved punishment is itself an 
intrinsically good and valuable outcome, regardless of whether any other 
positive consequences attend it. 
The CR approach has been noted in the literature but never explicitly 
embraced. For example, Michael Moore has alluded to the possibility of 
consequentialist retributivism, though without subscribing to that approach 
himself.57 Dan Markel may be the only self-described retributivist whose 
elaboration of a retributive commitment adopts a CR perspective. Markel 
views retribution as “worthwhile in itself,”58 but also recognizes that 
punishment institutions cannot be “indifferen[t] to the consequences and 
costs of punishment.”59 As a result, he aligns himself with the fundamental 
CR conception of retribution as a goal to be pursued subject to real-world 
constraints, rather than as a binding moral duty: 
[T]he practice of retribution is only one attractive social practice 
among many. . . . [R]esources spent on the project of retributive 
justice are resources not spent on feeding the hungry, housing the 
homeless, and healing the sick. Thus, to say that retributive justice 
justifies punishment under ordinary circumstances does not mean 
 
 
Implications for Optimal Enforcement Strategy, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 223 (2000) (incorporating 
“taste” or preference for retribution into economic analysis of punishment); Paul H. Robinson & John 
M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1997) (defending desert-based punishment as 
the best way to achieve deterrence). 
 Jean Hampton has also suggested one version of such a theory, defending punishment (including 
retributive punishment) as a means for advancing goals external to the punishment itself: specifically, 
moral education. See, e.g., Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of 
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1659 n.2 (1992) (citing Hampton’s own previous work offering a 
“moral education” theory of punishment, and asserting continuing adherence to the position that 
“moral education and deterrence should be goals of any well-designed system of punishment”); id. at 
1701 n.65 (“[T]he theory of retribution I have elaborated understands punishment in a way that may 
often be consistent with and supportive of the goal of moral education.”). Yet Hampton is certainly no 
pure consequentialist. She adopts a “pluralist approach,” id., that also involves a commitment to 
retribution as an intrinsic good. See, e.g., id. at 1659, 1701 (defending retribution as moral imperative); 
Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND 
MERCY 111, 129B33 (1988) (distinguishing “retributive motive” from other, instrumental goals of 
punishment, and cautioning against mistaking “retributive punishment for moral education”). 
 57. See MOORE, supra note 14, at 155–59. But cf. infra notes 146–49 (discussing Moore’s recent 
support for a consequentialist perspective as to the general design of criminal justice institutions). 
 58. Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the 
Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2193 (2001); see also 
Markel, supra note 22, at 435 (describing retribution as an “intrinsic good”); Markel, supra note 11, at 
1450 (“[Retribution] is a practice that, generally speaking, can be justified apart from the contingent 
benefits it might generate.”). 
 59. Markel, supra note 58, at 2193; see also id. (asserting retribution is a valid basis for 
punishment if it “does something good and . . . the good it achieves is not outweighed by some other 
course of action”); id. at 2194 (asserting a version of retributivism in which “states are justified and 
(defeasibly) obligated to respond to legal wrongdoing”) (emphasis added). 
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that punishment ought to be imposed under all circumstances such 
that the ceaseless pursuit of justice consumes our every and last unit 
of social resources.60 
Markel has even applied his understanding of retribution to real-world 
enforcement and prosecution issues such as imposition of the death 
penalty61 and other sanctions62 and the role of mercy in adjudicating 
cases.63 At the same time, Markel does not overtly adopt or defend a CR 
account covering all aspects of criminal justice, such as law enforcement 
priorities or certain aspects of prosecutorial discretion. For example, he 
clearly finds that retribution offers a justification for creating institutions 
of punishment, but he also hints that at least some aspects of the system’s 
implementation decisions about what or how to punish might best be left 
to democratic or otherwise political processes.64 
Clearly the CR view eases the demands on both police and 
prosecutors. Police may pursue a more flexible strategy that targets 
whatever mix of offenders combine to generate the largest total amount of 
desert-based punishment, rather than necessarily striving to apprehend the 
largest possible raw number of criminals (as under the first view) or 
having to focus their attention on the most serious subset of offenses (as 
under the second view). Prosecutors would gain even more freedom, as 
they would be able to forgo punishment (or accept reduced punishment) 
for some offenders, if doing so would enhance the total measure of desert-
based punishment. This approach might also allow prosecutors to seek 
departures from desert that impose excessive punishment for the sake of 
achieving more deserved punishment (or avoiding undeserved 
punishment) in other cases. 
 
 
 60. Markel, supra note 22, at 436–37; see also Markel, supra note 58, at 2212–13. Mitchell 
Berman similarly suggests the need to situate retributive principles within a broadly consequentialist 
scheme if one is to justify retribution relative to its costs or to other social goods. See supra note 37. 
 61. See Markel, supra note 22, at 440–77. 
 62. See Markel, supra note 58, at 2215–40. 
 63. See Markel, supra note 11, at 1453–73. 
 64. See Markel, supra note 58, at 2205 (“[L]egislators are the ones interpreting the criminal act 
and they may properly, i.e., democratically, denominate what counts as meriting more severe penalties 
and what should not, based on a variety of factors . . . .”); Markel, supra note 11, at 1433 (“The 
intensity of [retributive] punishment and the trigger for the punishment are products of democratic 
deliberation.”). 
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D. Silence: A Limited Scope for Retributivism 
The possibility remains that retributivism simply offers no firm rules 
about how to implement substantive criminal law rules. Under this view, 
those charged with enforcing the law would be free to pursue other, non-
retributive objectives. In this scenario, law enforcement officials are 
essentially unguided by retributivism in that no part of their project is 
driven or necessitated by retributivist theory or goals. 
For example, one might adopt a version of deontological retributivism 
that finds many or all of the enforcement matters this Article addresses to 
simply fall outside the scope of any deontic obligation. Many descriptions 
of such obligations limit their scope to instances where a situation or result 
is the product of the actor’s affirmative intent or choice, rather than merely 
being foreseen or allowed to occur.65 Under these characterizations of 
deontic duty, any such duty might not bind institutional actors whose 
choices are in some way forced by resource limitations or other inevitable 
constraints.66 Accordingly, whatever investigatory or prosecutorial 
tradeoffs are necessitated by real-world exigencies would not be subject to 
the command (or the guidance) of any deontological imperative. 
Such a result might seem disappointing for retributivism, as it would 
mean that retributive principles have little or nothing to say about many 
aspects of real-world criminal justice. Yet it also suggests that a 
punishment system can at least remain consistent with retributivism even 
if that system is unguided by retributivist principles at the enforcement 
level. Some thinkers suggest that a criminal justice system can still 
properly be considered “retributivist” so long as retributive justice remains 
the underlying justification for punishment, even if it does not supply the 
decision rule for every individual case: 
Some of the ‘mixed theorists’ [i.e., theorists who claim both 
retributive and utilitarian considerations justify punishment] have 
 
 
 65. See infra notes 90–95 and accompanying text (discussing similar position in context of 
charge that any criminal justice system violates deontological retributivism by allowing punishment of 
the innocent). 
 66. Cf. Michael S. Moore, Four Reflections on Law and Morality, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1523, 1552 n.79 (2007) [hereinafter Moore, Reflections] (suggesting that “choice sets” of institutional 
designers who must allocate scarce resources, such as legislatures, fall “outside the scope” of 
deontological obligations, as they lack requisite intent or affirmative action—but indicating that 
individual “governmental actors like judges, policemen, attorneys, etc.” remain subject to 
deontological obligations); Michael S. Moore, Patrolling the Borders of Consequentialist 
Justifications: The Scope of Agent-Relative Restrictions, 27 LAW & PHIL. 35 (2008) [hereinafter 
Moore, Patrolling the Borders]. 
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wished to distinguish the general justifying aim of the criminal law 
from the justifications of particular decisions within an ongoing 
criminal law system. While such a distinction certainly has its uses, 
it is of no use in wedding retributivist to, say, utilitarian concerns in 
justifying punishment. Even if one were to concede the existence of 
‘practice rules’—rules which require moral justification but whose 
application to particular cases is to be made without resort to that 
moral justification—such concession goes no distance towards 
introducing any alien concerns into either a retributive or a 
utilitarian punishment scheme. That is, if one is a utilitarian in his 
justification of the practice of punishment, one will remain purely a 
utilitarian even if one bars utility calculations in applying criminal 
law rules; and mutatis mutandis for the retributivist.67 
Interestingly, the most notable of the “mixed theorists” Moore is 
describing advocated essentially the inverse approach to the one suggested 
here, claiming that the general justificatory purpose of criminal law is 
utilitarian but that specific cases of punishment should satisfy retributive 
concerns.68 This view may have much to recommend it, but it does not 
provide a version of real-world retribution, as it clearly considers 
utilitarian concerns paramount in justifying punishment. Further, this view 
may raise the same issues as a “pure” retributive model in terms of its 
practical comprehensiveness, as it seems to offer guidance to only two of 
three branches of government: it sets an agenda for legislators who enact 
criminal law and suggests how adjudicators should resolve individual 
cases, but it does not help set the enforcement agenda of executive agents 
such as police and prosecutors.69 
Two possible versions of the distinct approach advanced here, where 
retributive considerations might dictate the substantive rules of criminal 
law but do not govern enforcement issues, suggest themselves most 
obviously.70 The first alternative enforcement agenda would be to pursue 
 
 
 67. See MOORE, supra note 14, at 154–55 (internal footnotes omitted). 
 68. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
3B13 (1968) (identifying utilitarian considerations as the “general justifying aim” for criminal law, but 
also finding retributive considerations relevant to the “distribution” of punishment, i.e., decisions 
about which individuals to punish); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955) 
(asserting that utilitarian concerns justify the existence of institutions of punishment, whereas 
retributive concerns should guide the application of punishment in particular cases). 
 69. Rawls, for example, distinguishes between the utilitarian “legislator” and the retributive 
“judge,” see id. at 6–7, but does not describe whether a police department or prosecutor’s office stands 
in a position more akin to one of these than the other. Id. 
 70. Larry Alexander suggests a different allocation between deontological and consequentialist 
concerns: 
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utilitarian crime control. Under this option, the criminal justice system 
would basically have two different components, each with different 
operational goals. The legislature and other substantive lawmakers, such 
as sentencing commissions and appellate courts, would generate rules 
governing criminal liability that specify who deserves punishment in a 
retributive sense. The executive agents charged with applying those 
rules—police and prosecutors—would pursue an enforcement strategy 
seeking to minimize crime. 
The second possibility is that, instead of adopting a utilitarian agenda, 
law enforcement authorities should not adopt an ex ante agenda at all. 
Instead of expecting authorities to pursue a single goal specified in 
advance, this option would merely set out the criminal law’s general 
substantive rules and then trust officials to act as sensible agents in 
enforcing that law on an ad hoc basis. The officials might favor retributive 
concerns in some situations and utilitarian ones in others, depending on 
the facts of the specific case or on broader considerations such as the 
current crime rate, with enforcement focusing more on utilitarian crime 
control measures as crime becomes more prevalent.71 Under this view, the 
critique that retributivism offers too little real-world guidance loses some 
force—one could as easily accuse the utilitarian project of providing too 
 
 
In my opinion, the best conception of deontology would deem its core principle to be that one 
may never use another as a resource without his consent. In other words, a person’s body, 
labor, and talents do not exist for others’ benefit except to the extent that he freely chooses to 
benefit others. 
 Outside the realm of appropriating others’ bodies, labor, and talents, deontology is 
inapplicable. Thus, in settling conflicts over uses of natural resources and incompatible 
activities, consequentialist considerations will be just as relevant to the deontologist as they 
are to the consequentialist. . . . 
 Therefore, the deontologist can, like the consequentialist, consider consequences to be 
morally relevant within the domain beyond the deontological core. 
Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893, 911 (2000). 
 Alexander’s scheme, however, would not eliminate the need to offer some deontological account 
of how to structure the criminal justice system, for two reasons. First, the practice of punishment itself 
is a “physical appropriation” under Alexander’s scheme, and therefore could only be justified or 
implemented by reference to deontological principles, not consequentialist ones. Second, even if 
punishment itself is not an appropriation, many crimes would constitute such appropriations. 
Accordingly, criminal justice institutions following Alexander’s approach, which would both impose 
and redress “physical appropriations” and therefore be subject to deontological constraints, would 
confront the same inevitable practical tradeoffs that this article challenges any other retributivist theory 
to address. 
 71. It may be interesting to observe that the resurgence of retributivism, both in the scholarly 
literature and in the policy discourse about issues such as sentencing, coincides with falling crime 
levels. If the crime rate were to increase significantly, considerations of prevention might well become 
more prominent as a practical matter. 
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much guidance in claiming that we should always follow a single goal in 
implementing criminal law. 
Perhaps there exists a casual assumption or expectation that the 
criminal justice system is designed to work, or should work, in one of 
these ways: either (a) the law’s job is to say what is wrong, but police 
officers’ job is to keep us safe; or (b) the law states clear rules, but 
officials have (and should have) discretion to choose whether, how, and 
why to implement the rules in individual cases. Crimes are defined so that 
we can punish someone only based on his or her past wrongdoing;72 but 
within the universe of wrongdoers, we try to punish where doing so will 
“lock up” a dangerous person, “send a message” to others, or otherwise 
minimize crime.73 Or, at least, as the second version of unguided 
enforcement would have it, police and prosecutors may be swayed mainly 
by such considerations in some cases but focus more on an offender’s 
blameworthiness, the victim’s outrage, or other influences in other cases—
without any clear “threshold” dictating when moral blame counts more 
than crime control or vice versa. 
These two options might be consistent with retributivism, and might 
even have some descriptive accuracy in capturing how the system works, 
or how people expect or want it to work, but a committed retributivist 
 
 
 72. Interestingly, this aspect of criminal law may reveal criminal law’s general retributive 
orientation, for a purely utilitarian set of substantive criminal rules would presumably have no such 
limitation. A utilitarian criminal code might contain descriptions of conduct to avoid, for the sake of 
giving notice to the public and thereby achieving behavior control. But, then again, a similar document 
without binding legal force, made available to the public, could accomplish this goal as well. The main 
legal function of a criminal code is to define when a person is subject to prosecution and punishment 
by the state, and, under a purely utilitarian system, amenability to prosecution and punishment would 
not depend on a person’s having already engaged in prohibited conduct but only on whether the person 
is dangerous or his punishment would deter others. In other words, the code’s rules for officials (who 
ultimately enforce the code as law) would contain no prohibition against punishing one who had not 
yet committed a “crime.” This feature of a utilitarian criminal justice system drives the most 
fundamental criticism of utilitarianism—in theory, at least, it imposes no bar against punishing the 
innocent. 
 Indeed, it is hard to imagine what the rules of a purely utilitarian criminal code would look like, 
for its features would differ greatly from any contemporary criminal code. Its adjudicatory rules 
presumably would not focus on matters of culpability or individual responsibility, except as those 
issues bear on an “offender’s” propensity toward future criminality, or on the efficacy of punishment 
as a deterrent measure. Pure utilitarianism’s implications for substantive criminal law may be as 
unexplored as retributivism’s implications for the enforcement of that law. 
 The above discussion, however, might apply only to an act-utilitarian punishment scheme—as do 
the standard, well-rehearsed objections to utilitarianism, such as the complaint that it would not 
preclude punishment of the innocent. See Binder, supra note 19, at 322–27; Guyora Binder & Nicholas 
J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism and Punishment of the Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115 (2000). 
Perhaps a rule-utilitarian criminal code or system would permit punishment of guilty wrongdoers only. 
 73. See ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 14, at 117–36 (discussing each of these rationalizations 
for punishment and how each might conflict with the goal of desert-based punishment). 
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presumably would not view them as desirable—and neither, perhaps, 
would anyone else reflecting on the matter.74 Whatever appeal they have 
lies precisely in the fact that, and the degree to which, they are able to 
pursue goals entirely distinct from the retributivist’s project. Even if either 
or both might be sound as a policy matter—a contestable point, to be sure, 
for what looks like beneficial flexibility to one person may look like 
baseless inconsistency to another75—neither amounts to a version of real-
world retribution, for both depend on the concession that retributive 
considerations offer no clear or consistent guidance about real-world 
implementation matters. And since both options anticipate an enforcement 
scheme with either no clear objective or else a forward-looking, strictly 
utilitarian objective of minimizing future crime, it does not seem 
worthwhile to compare or contrast them with the three other models, all of 
which share (though in varying forms, and perhaps to varying degrees) a 
separate common objective: punishing blameworthy offenders based on 
their desert. Accordingly, although it seems useful to include these 
potential enforcement schemes in the menu of options set out in this Part, 
the balance of this Article does not seek to describe or evaluate them 
further. 
E. The Nuclear Option: Abandon Retributivism Altogether 
A final possible reaction to retributivism’s lack of a prescriptive agenda 
is to view it as fatal for retributivism altogether, even as a guiding 
justificatory principle. In one of the few previous articles focusing directly 
on the difficulties of putting retributive theory into practice, Russell 
Christopher draws that very conclusion. Christopher’s analysis centers on 
one problem for retributivism in the real world—what he calls “the 
prosecutor’s dilemma.”76 The dilemma arises most clearly in a stylized 
example Christopher provides: a prosecutor is approached by one offender 
who offers to provide testimony against two other, equally serious 
 
 
 74. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 316 n.47 (“[The] mixed view seems difficult to 
defend. . . . [T]he view appears to be illogical at the most basic level. If one principle—be it welfarism 
or retributivism—is supposed to be ethically attractive, why is that principle not always our ethical 
guide? How can our ethical objective change just because we happen to be discussing the application 
of punishment by judges instead of the determination of laws (including those that set punishments) by 
legislatures?”). 
 75. Compare Bierschbach & Stein, supra note 6 (suggesting the possible advantages of having 
procedural rules mediate between retributive and utilitarian goals), with KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra 
note 7, at 317 n.47 (suggesting that having different institutions follow different goals may lead to “a 
justice system that is inferior with regard to both systems of evaluation”). 
 76. See Christopher, supra note 5. 
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offenders, in return for immunity from punishment; without such 
testimony, by hypothesis, punishment of the other two offenders is 
impossible. In such a scenario, the prosecutor must necessarily forgo 
punishment of one offender to pursue punishment of the other. Because 
retributivism imposes a moral duty to punish, as well as a duty to treat 
equal cases alike, Christopher concludes that any resolution of the 
dilemma is a violation of retributivism. He views this result as an 
indictment of retributivism as a theory rather than of immunity or plea-
bargaining as practices.77 
As this Article’s prior discussion makes clear, Christopher is right to 
seize on the failure of retributive theory thus far to offer anything more 
than hints about its own proper application, and he deserves credit as one 
of the few commentators to draw attention to the theory’s practical 
implications. However, his conclusion—that retributivism’s inability to 
satisfactorily resolve the prosecutor’s dilemma reduces the entire theory to 
utter absurdity—is too strong. It is doubtless true that practical obstacles 
will predictably create situations where the goal of desert-based 
punishment cannot be achieved, must be traded off against other goals, or 
must even be traded off against itself. But this is not uniquely true of 
retributive punishment; the same could be said of our limited ability to 
pursue any idealized principle in the real world. That we might sometimes 
limit freedom for the sake of promoting some other goal (say, safety), or 
limit it for its own sake (curbing one person’s freedom to enhance 
another’s), does not indicate that freedom is a meaningless, empty, or 
incoherent concept or value. Even diehard retributivists have noted that 
imposing just punishment is merely one principled objective among 
numerous objectives we might embrace, and as such is bound to compete 
with other goals78 or practical cost considerations.79 Indeed, such 
 
 
 77. See id. at 105 (“[T]he incompatibility of retributivism and bargain justice now renders 
illegitimate not bargain justice, but rather retributivism.”). 
 78. See MOORE, supra note 14, at 172 (“The retributivist like anyone else can admit that there 
are other intrinsic goods, such as the goods protected by the rights to life, liberty, and bodily integrity. 
The retributivist can also admit that sometimes some of these rights will trump the achieving of 
retributive justice . . . .”); id. at 186 (“[H]ere again we need to remind ourselves that retributivists are 
not monomaniacal about the achieving of retributive justice. Of course those who culpably do some 
(slight or great) moral wrong deserve some (slight or great) suffering, yet there are other intrinsic 
goods besides giving culpable wrongdoers their due and sometimes these other goods override the 
achievement of retributive justice. One such collection of goods we have called the principle of 
legality . . . .”); see also supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 79. See MOORE, supra note 14, at 151 (“It is always relevant to ask, ‘at what cost do we attain 
some form of justice?’ . . . Trivial immoralities, and immoralities done in private, by consenting 
individuals, that are strongly motivated, are not worth the enforcement costs to criminalize and to 
punish.”); cf. Markel, supra note 22, at 429 (“If we insisted that the state actually achieve complete 
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constraints might not only affect the system’s ability to enforce the law, 
but might also influence substantive decisions about what moral wrongs to 
criminalize in the first place.80 
Without ignoring or minimizing retributivism’s limitations, abandoning 
it altogether seems a hasty response. For reasons noted earlier,81 this 
Article assumes that retributivism is a prima facie legitimate perspective 
and proposes to investigate whether it can address the purported plea-
bargaining dilemma and other enforcement issues, or whether its project 
necessarily skirts these issues (and if so, what that means). As discussed 
earlier in this Part, retributive theory itself suggests at least three possible 
means of implementing its principles. The balance of this Article seeks to 
further elaborate what each of those methods would entail as a practical 
matter and to evaluate the methods based on both their internal logic and 
their external ramifications. 
II. APPLYING THE OPTIONS: MAKING RETRIBUTION REAL 
This Part applies each of the three possible versions of real-world 
retribution sketched above to specific issues, discussing how each might 
guide actual enforcement decisions. Section A addresses basic issues 
confronting police departments, while section B deals with prosecutorial 
practices.82 
 
 
enforcement and punishment, we would then be placed in the untenable position of spending all of our 
collective resources on criminal justice.”). 
 80. See MOORE, supra note 14, at 68 (noting different kinds of possible “limits to the use of 
criminal law that should lead us to eschew prohibiting certain conduct even if it is morally wrongful”); 
id. at 661B65, 739B95 (describing and defending various considerations, such as personal liberty, that 
limit the proper scope of retributivist criminal prohibitions). 
 81. See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text. 
 82. The discussion in this Part will not focus on issues related to criminal sentencing, which 
might also seem to merit consideration as a significant aspect of the application of criminal rules in 
individual cases. The reason for sentencing’s absence from this discussion is that all of the retributive 
models would likely address sentencing questions in a roughly similar way, in keeping with some form 
of the “limiting retributivism” approach various commentators have described. See, e.g., Richard S. 
Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: “Proportionality” 
Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 590–92, 623–25 (2005); Richard S. Frase, Limiting 
Retributivism, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 83 (Michael Tonry ed., 2004); Youngjae Lee, The 
Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 704 (2005); Norval Morris, 
Desert as a Limiting Principle, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 201 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew 
Ashworth eds., 1992); cf. ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 14, at 212–17 (proposing scheme where 
desert dictates the amount of punishment but utilitarian concerns influence the method of punishment). 
 The premise of the limiting-retributivism approach to sentencing is that retributive concerns (no 
matter how seriously one is committed to them) cannot and do not dictate an exact punishment for any 
given offender but only prescribe a relative assessment of the seriousness of the offense, which can 
then generate a range of acceptable sentencing options. Once retributive concerns have set this range, 
other considerations—such as incapacitation, rehabilitation, or other utilitarian goals—may influence 
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A. Police Priorities 
A particular example might facilitate comparison of the differences 
among the three schemes for real-world retribution in terms of the 
priorities they would set for police departments. I offer the (admittedly 
stylized and simplified) scenario of a society confronted with the 
following universe of crimes and criminals each year: 
 
Offense 
 
No. of 
Offenders 
 
Cost to 
Apprehend 
 
Error 
Rate 
 
Punishment
 
Cost Per 
Unit of 
Deserved 
Punishment 
 
Shoplifting 
 
440 (220 + 
220) 
 
$100 / 
$450 
 
0% / 
20% 
 
1 month 
 
$100 / 
$750 
 
Car Theft 
 
280 
 
$450 
 
20% 
 
30 months 
 
$25 
 
Aggravated 
Battery 
 
200 
 
$225 
 
5% 
 
50 months 
 
$5 
 
Murder 
 
4 
 
$1,080 
 
10% 
 
225 months 
 
$6 
 
The substantive content of the criminal prohibitions is not especially 
important; other offenses could substitute for those listed with no effect on 
the scenario. For purposes of simplicity, the hypothetical generally 
 
 
the selection of a specific sentence within the range. Indeed, so long as the punishment is within the 
prescribed range, nonretributive concerns could guide the method of punishment as well as the specific 
amount of punishment without offending retributive principles. See ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 
14, at 212B17. Of course, to the extent that the initial retributive distinctions are highly nuanced, as 
some research indicates, the available punishment range will narrow, reducing the influence of 
nonretributive considerations. See Paul H. Robinson, The A.L.I.’s Proposed Distributive Principle of 
“Limiting Retributivism”: Does It Mean in Practice Anything Other than Pure Desert?, 7 BUFF. CRIM. 
L. REV. 3, 10B12 (2003). 
 Because any sentence within the range prescribed by a limiting-retributivism scheme would 
comport with the offender’s desert, application of such a scheme in any individual case would satisfy 
any of the models this Article sets out, including the absolutist model. On the other hand, sentencing 
rules authorizing any amount of undeserved punishment, or less punishment than deserved, would 
violate the retributivist principle, so all three models would strongly disfavor or entirely prohibit such 
rules. 
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assumes that the “cost to apprehend” (meaning the total costs of finding 
and prosecuting each offender—note that the low dollar figures posited 
here for convenience’s sake could be multiplied across the board by ten, or 
one hundred, with no impact on the analysis), the “error rate” (that is, the 
frequency with which an arrestee is not the actual offender),83 and the 
corresponding punishment are constant for all commissions of each crime. 
The hypothetical also introduces one exception to this general uniformity, 
for the sake of hinting at how more nuanced schemes might play out. For 
shoplifting, the hypothetical assumes half the shoplifters are caught in the 
act, thus having low apprehension costs and an effective error rate of zero, 
whereas the other half get away, becoming just as hard to catch as the car 
thieves. Increasing the variability of the factors might make the 
hypothetical more realistic, but would not alter or undermine anything 
significant in the discussion below.84 
 
 
 83. This hypothetical assumes that the police department could even ascertain or estimate what 
its own error rate would be for various crimes, which might be an unwarranted speculation. An actual 
police department might lack this information and would have to rely on other considerations. Indeed, 
it appears that little is currently known about error rates. Darryl Brown has discussed some of the 
relevant, and conflicting, factors that might influence the rate of error across different crimes: 
It is unclear as a practical matter whether one of these categories—wrongful small 
punishments or wrongful large ones—is realistically more likely. We have certainly learned 
in recent years that wrongful convictions happen even in cases involving the most serious 
crime—capital murder. But it may be that the factual nature of serious cases makes them 
more prone to erroneous outcomes than simpler, low-level cases. On the other hand, more 
resources are probably committed to investigating and prosecuting serious cases, which might 
mean a higher error rate in the investigation and charging of low-level crimes. Similarly, 
political pressure for conviction should be greater in serious cases, but public (and defense-
side) scrutiny of the prosecution is probably greater as well. 
Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from Institutional Design, 
104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 819 n.69 (2004). 
 Defined in terms of how many arrestees are either not prosecuted or not convicted (the relevant 
factors in a discussion of police arrest decisions), the rates may be rather high. See, e.g., McGregor 
Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word: A Criminal Defense Attorney’s Guide to Using Invisible 
Punishments as an Advocacy Strategy, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 479, 481 n.15 (2005) (“In 2002, only 62.1% 
of all arrests [in the state of New York] resulted in a conviction for any offense. . . . In New York City, 
only 57.4% of arrests resulted in convictions.” (citing statistics available in New York State Division 
of Criminal Justice Services, Dispositions of Adult Arrests 1999–2006, 
http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/dispos/index.htm)). Defined in terms of how many 
prosecuted defendants are actually innocent, the limited evidence suggests a much lower error rate. 
See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal 
Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1595 n.34 (2005) (“One rough and conservative estimate based 
mostly on surveys of judges and attorneys posits an accuracy rate of 99.5%.” (citing C. RONALD HUFF 
ET AL., CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND PUBLIC POLICY 53B62 (1996))). 
 In any case, rate of error, defined either of these ways, would surely be highly relevant for any 
retribution-oriented police department or prosecutors’ office. 
 84. Further, some of the figures might experience increasing or decreasing marginal rates based 
on the number of offenders prosecuted in each category, along the lines of the breakdown I have 
presented for shoplifting but in more complex fashion. A conscious decision by the police and 
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Across crimes, however, the punishment levels, apprehension costs, 
error rates, and number of offenders vary, as would clearly be true in any 
actual situation. The punishment levels listed roughly track the averages 
for the offenses in question.85 The figures chosen for the number of 
offenders, the apprehension costs, and the error rate within each category 
are essentially, though not entirely, arbitrary,86 chosen to make the 
distinctions between the different models more transparent. It will be 
obvious from the following discussion how manipulating those figures 
would affect the relative priorities within each retributive law enforcement 
scheme. 
The final column uses the apprehension cost, error rate, and 
punishment columns to calculate the cost to the system for each unit of 
 
 
prosecutors themselves to pursue fewer cases might also reduce the error rate. See James S. Liebman 
& Lawrence C. Marshall, Less Is Better: Justice Stevens and the Narrowed Death Penalty, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1607, 1661 (2006) (“[E]vidence reveals that reducing the numerousness of capital 
prosecutions and verdicts tends to decrease the rate of error as well.”). 
 These variations would complicate the application but would not alter the enforcement agenda. 
They would simply require enforcers to set priorities within offense categories that would replicate 
some features of their priorities across offense categories. 
 85. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE 
COURTS, 2002, at 5 tbl.4 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fssc02.pdf 
[hereinafter FELONY SENTENCES 2002]. The report shows the following average prison sentences 
imposed for felonies in state courts in 2002: murder, 225 months; aggravated assault, 54 months; 
motor vehicle theft, 30 months. Id. The estimated amount of actual time to be served for those 
sentences, however, is a mere 49–66% of the sentence imposed. Id. 
 86. As to number of offenders, available FBI data providing nationwide totals for various crimes 
from 1987 to 2006 reveal an overall ratio for that period of approximately 70 motor vehicle thefts for 
every 50 aggravated assaults and for every single “murder and nonnegligent manslaughter.” See 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2006, at tbl.1, available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/data/table_01.html [hereinafter CRIME IN THE U.S. 2006]. The annual 
rates within that time period vary somewhat but not greatly: each year shows a ratio of 64–77 motor 
vehicle thefts for each murder, and 43–59 aggravated assaults for each murder. See id. The table above 
maintains the 70:50:1 ratio for those three crimes. Another FBI table, from the same study, showing 
property crime totals for the last five years, shows a ratio of about 55 cases of shoplifting for every 70 
motor vehicle thefts. See CRIME IN THE U.S. 2006, supra, at tbl.7, available at  
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/data/table_07.html. The table reflects this by maintaining a ratio of 
70:55 between the car thefts and the “easy” cases of shoplifting, on the assumption that many other 
cases of shoplifting (the hard ones to catch) are not reported or otherwise, as the FBI reports put it, 
“known to law enforcement.” Indeed, many may not even be detected. 
 As to apprehension costs, I am aware of no available hard data that might give any indication of 
how much, on average, it costs any American criminal justice system to find and prosecute an 
individual offender in any given offense category. The costs provided in the table were selected partly 
to generate reasonably simple numbers in the cost-per-unit column, and partly to reflect reasonable 
assumptions about the difficulty of enforcing different crimes. It would seem, for example, that 
murder, where the victim obviously cannot report the crime and the offender has a stronger incentive 
to avoid detection, would have much higher enforcement costs than the other crimes. For aggravated 
battery, on the other hand, the victim might know the assailant, making costs somewhat lower (though 
not all victims may come forward to prosecute).  
 As to error rates, see supra note 83. 
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deserved punishment—which, of course, is what a retributive system 
seeks. Taking the example of aggravated battery, every 20 arrests will cost 
a total of $5,400. One of those arrests (5% of 20), however, will be an 
innocent person, so the total amount of deserved punishment will only be 
that for 19 offenders (19 times 50, or 950). Yet, if we assume that the 
erroneously arrested person is actually prosecuted and punished, the 
amount must be further reduced to account for the undeserved punishment 
inflicted on that person. Making the admittedly contestable assumption 
that one unit of undeserved punishment is equivalent to (the negation of) 
one unit of deserved punishment,87 it is necessary to subtract an additional 
50 units from the punishment total, reducing it to 900. Dividing the costs 
of $5,400 by the total deserved punishment of 1,800 yields a per-unit cost 
of $5. 
Assume that this society’s police department has a fixed annual budget. 
The amount of the budget is unimportant as long as it is less than 
$296,320, that being the amount it would cost the department to apprehend 
all offenders.88 In other words, assume the budget is small enough to 
require the department to make choices about which crimes to prioritize 
for enforcement purposes and which offenders must remain at large.89 The 
 
 
 87. It is unclear whether retributivism is neutral as between “false positives” (undeserving people 
who are punished) and “false negatives” (deserving people who fail to be punished), or whether 
retributivism should be seen as valuing the avoidance of punishing the innocent more highly than the 
imposition of punishment on the guilty. See, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 342 n.103 
(expressing uncertainty as to retributivism’s view of how to balance positive value of deserved 
punishment against negative value of punishing the innocent); Bierschbach & Stein, supra note 6, at 
1208 (defending claim that retributivism is “agnostic” between these two kinds of error and “expresses 
no strong preferences for whether [evidentiary] rules skew more toward the side of false positives or 
more toward false negatives”); Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of 
“Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 912–13 (2002) (discussing the debate within retributivism 
as to whether punishing the innocent is worse than failing to punish the guilty).  
 If this assumption were modified to ignore the “retribution losses” from punishing the innocent 
(e.g., by assuming wrongly arrested persons were later released without prosecution), or to take them 
more seriously (e.g., by treating a unit of undeserved punishment as offsetting two or three units, 
rather than one unit, of deserved punishment), the absolute per-unit costs of deserved punishment for 
the various offenses would change and the ratios between their costs would change (though not 
radically), but their relative ranking in terms of per-unit cost would not. Thus, the analysis of priorities 
under CR—the retributive scheme most affected by per-unit costs—might change somewhat if such an 
alteration were made, but the basic elaboration of the CR approach should make clear how it would 
work under any of these assumptions. 
 88. More accurately, this is the amount that it would cost for the department to make arrests for 
all offenses. With a nonzero error rate, some offenders would remain at large—but the police 
department, not knowing when it had arrested the wrong person, would not know to continue pursuing 
any of those offenders. 
 89. One might question whether a police department can exercise the kind of control over its 
enforcement practices that this discussion might imply. Often the police are merely reactive, 
responding to complaints of crime and trying to find the offenders, rather than making conscious 
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question here is how each of the versions of real-world retribution 
discussed in Part I would guide those choices. 
Notably, a purely utilitarian criminal justice system would, at least in 
theory, have a clear agenda for setting police priorities: it would promote 
the mix of enforcement that prevents the most crime (or, more accurately, 
avoids the most harm) relative to cost. Such an agenda would require 
consideration of various factors, including many beyond those appearing 
in the chart above—such as the effect of punishing a given crime one year 
on the amount of that crime the following year, the relative “harm” each 
crime is thought to impose on its victim, or the costs of punishment in 
addition to the costs of apprehension—and the balancing of those factors 
would surely prove complex. Nonetheless, the enforcement agenda would 
be clear. 
What agenda would a retributive system set for itself? Each of the three 
versions of real-world retribution described in Part I will generate a 
 
 
decisions in advance about which crimes they will pursue. Certainly that is true, and it gives rise to its 
own question in terms of the practical application of retributivism. At least some versions of 
retributivism suggest a duty to punish known offenders. See supra Part I.A. On this view, would there 
also be some (perhaps weaker) obligation to investigate known offenses—as opposed to, say, devoting 
resources to a sting or undercover operation that may or may not uncover any wrongdoing? Though 
that view may be possible, I am not aware of anything in the existing literature that states or strongly 
implies such a view. To the contrary, the principled, nonconsequentialist approach of retributivism 
should deny any place for the kinds of concerns that would lead the police to prioritize reported crimes 
over unreported ones—for example, satisfying the victim(s) or maintaining the reputation of the police 
department itself, both of which are beneficial consequences unrelated to the offender’s desert. Cf. 
Michael Moore, Victims and Retribution: A Reply to Professor Fletcher, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 65, 67 
(1999) (“I think victims should and must be ignored if you are claiming to be doing retributive 
theory.”). But cf. Fletcher, supra note 40, at 55 (arguing that Moore’s retributivist “view of deserved 
punishment would be richer if it included the suffering of victims in his account of why punishment is 
deserved and therefore just”). 
 As to the crux of the criticism here—that crimes dictate the police’s agenda, rather than the 
police’s agenda dictating what crimes are investigated—though it is surely accurate for much police 
work, I do not think it affects the discussion here, for two reasons. First, to the extent police merely 
react to external forces, police work would look exactly the same under a purely utilitarian model, a 
purely retributivist model, or any other model; to the extent such forces do drive enforcement 
practices, there is nothing much for this Article to say about that aspect of enforcement other than to 
note its existence. 
 Second, that aspect surely does not describe the whole of police work. Many aspects of police 
work involve something other than an immediate effort to respond to a reported crime: for example, 
most undercover work is not of this sort, nor would police reopen “cold cases” if police lacked the 
ability to set their own priorities. Further, even for many reported crimes, the level of police 
commitment to finding the offender surely varies (and should vary, under either a utilitarian model or 
any of the real-world retribution models discussed here). Police are highly likely to devote less 
attention to tracking down a nonviolent property offender than a murderer—and note that such a 
decision cannot always be justified solely on consequentialist grounds, as the facts might indicate that 
the car thief is likely to reoffend while the killer is not. 
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different allocation of police resources. This section considers them in 
turn. 
1. The Absolutist Model 
The absolutist model views desert-based punishment as a moral duty. 
Accordingly, the system has an obligation to punish the deserving and 
refrain from punishing the undeserving. As noted above, the usual 
elaboration of this view does not vary the magnitude of the duty based on 
the magnitude of the relevant punishment: the duty to punish a minor 
wrongdoer is as strong as the duty to punish a more serious one, though 
the amount of punishment each would ultimately receive would be 
different. Accordingly, the law enforcement agenda under this view would 
focus specifically on two of the factors in the chart above: the error rate 
(which dictates how many people receive undeserved punishment) and the 
cost of apprehension (which dictates how many people receive deserved 
punishment). 
As to the error rate, one initial issue to surmount is whether an 
absolutist deontological system of retributive punishment would tolerate 
any error rate greater than zero. The argument here is that because an 
absolutist conception holds that punishing the innocent is always 
categorically forbidden, and because any real-world system of punishment 
(even a purely retributive one) will inevitably have errors resulting in 
innocents being punished, the absolutist is bound by her own principles to 
refrain from creating a system of punishment.90 Accordingly, the critique 
proceeds, (absolutist) retributivists are in a double bind: in satisfying the 
moral duty to punish the guilty, they are bound to violate the moral duty to 
avoid punishing the innocent.91 
 
 
 90. See, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 340B41 (claiming that retributivists insisting 
on the categorical impermissibility of punishing the innocent must reject any real-world punishment 
system); id. at 340 n.99 (citing commentators who have offered similar arguments); cf. Christopher, 
supra note 87, at 869–88 (arguing that any retributivist system will inevitably punish some innocents, 
and that while this may not be fatal to retributivism per se, it takes away retributivism’s asserted moral 
superiority to consequentialism); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Restorative Justice and the Jewish Question, 
2003 UTAH L. REV. 553 (noting that the Jewish tradition recognized the moral correctness of 
punishing wrongdoing but denied fallible humans the right to exact such deserved punishment). 
 91. Guyora Binder and Nicholas Smith describe the tension between the (absolutist) retributive 
duties: 
 Bentham is trying to be clear about two points that retributivists typically obscure: that 
punishment of the innocent is an unavoidable concomitant of punishing the guilty, but that 
punishment of the guilty is an avoidable policy choice. Thus, when retributivists claim to 
adhere rigidly to the principle of no undeserved punishment, they deceive themselves. If they 
really regarded avoiding punishment of the innocent as an absolute duty they could in fact 
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Some retributivists have responded to this critique,92 though their 
responses sometimes seem to soften the absolutist position and adopt some 
other version of retributivism.93 Further, the basis of the standard 
retributivist defense to this critique—that if the system did not knowingly 
or intentionally punish the innocent, it would violate no moral duty and 
would remain acceptable94—has been met with some skepticism.95 
Assuming for present purposes that the inevitability of a nonzero error rate 
would not prove fatal to an absolutist retributivist criminal justice system, 
the error rate would remain highly relevant under such a system, and the 
system’s absolutist commitments might compel it to dedicate vast 
resources to minimizing the rate of error. 
Aside from error rate, the absolutist model’s enforcement scheme 
would probably concentrate its focus on the per-offender cost of 
apprehension. The severity of the crime in question should not enter the 
calculus, for in the absolutist account, the duty to punish wrongdoing is 
categorical and therefore applies to all offenses, great and small. Facing 
constraints on its ability to punish all deserving offenders, the model’s 
second-best alternative would be to satisfy the duty to punish in as many 
cases as possible—that is, to maximize the number of deserving offenders 
receiving punishment.  
 
 
adhere to it by avoiding punishment. They do not appreciate that they are responsible for 
choosing to punish the innocent because they do not see punishment of the guilty as 
discretionary. 
 Retributivists in fact treat punishment of the guilty as an absolute duty which compels 
sacrifice of the innocent. 
Binder & Smith, supra note 72, at 143. 
 92. See MOORE, supra note 14, at 158 (“The probable punishment of the innocent by any real-
world punishment scheme is not much of a worry even for deontological versions of retributivism.”); 
Larry Alexander, Retributivism and the Inadvertent Punishment of the Innocent, 2 LAW & PHIL. 233 
(1983) (concluding that viable versions of retributivism do not categorically forbid risking punishment 
of innocents). 
 93. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 14, at 156B57 (noting, before defending the deontological view 
against critique based on the inevitable punishment of innocents, that such a critique is a “non-
problem” for a consequentialist retributivist). 
 94. See, e.g., id. at 158 (“Agent-relative moral norms bind us absolutely only with respect to 
evils we either intend or (on some versions) knowingly visit on specified individuals. One can thus 
arrange . . . punishment in ways that predictably hurt some who do not deserve to be hurt, without for a 
moment ceasing to be an agent-relative theorist about morality.”); Alexander, supra note 92, at 245 
(citing RONALD DWORKIN, Principle, Policy, Procedure, in CRIME, PROOF & PUNISHMENT, 195, 201–
10 (1981)). 
 95. See, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 344 n.106 (describing the distinction 
between intended and inadvertent punishment of the innocent as “substantially inaccurate in the 
present setting” as well as conceptually unconvincing); cf. Christopher, supra note 87, at 869B70, 
887B88 (asserting that a retributivist system would allow for intentional punishment of the innocent). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
850 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:815 
 
 
 
 
For the hypothetical scenario sketched here, then, the absolutist model 
would advise first pursuing all 220 of the easily-caught shoplifters, for 
whom both apprehension costs and error rates are lowest. After that, the 
model would support pursuing the batterers, for whom both apprehension 
costs and error rate rank second. This allocation of funding would both 
maximize the number of deserving offenders receiving punishment and 
minimize the number of undeserving innocents receiving punishment. 
2. The Threshold Model 
The threshold model differs from the absolutist model in its willingness 
to view the duty to punish as less than categorical—or at least, even if 
categorical in some sense,96 not uniform in its binding effect across all 
cases. While the absolutist model sees the duty to punish as unequivocal, 
the threshold model allows for two considerations to affect the duty’s 
power to oblige punishment in an individual case: first, the magnitude of 
the duty itself might vary based on the moral gravity of the offense; 
second, the magnitude of other relevant factors (such as the good or bad 
consequences of punishing) might sometimes, though rarely, grow large 
enough to trump retributive justice.97 
Because, under the threshold view, the force of the duty to punish an 
offense rises with the offense’s seriousness, this model would not seek to 
punish the most offenders (as the absolutist model does), but rather the 
most serious offenders. Its first priority would be to apprehend 
perpetrators of the most serious offense, as to whom the duty to punish is 
most acute; once all of those offenders had been punished, the model 
would focus on the second-most serious crime, and so on. Pursuing this 
agenda would require only an ordinal ranking of the seriousness of 
offenses and not any measure of the absolute magnitude of their 
seriousness or the “gap” between one and the next. A more serious crime, 
whether slightly or enormously graver than another crime, calls out more 
forcefully for punishment, and therefore would merit enforcement priority. 
The threshold model would also allow this set of priorities to give way 
to other concerns, such as cost, if these concerns became overwhelming.98 
Thus, in the more plausible scenario where not all offenses have the same 
 
 
 96. See supra note 42 (quoting Michael Moore, a threshold deontologist, describing duty to 
punish as “categorical” but nonetheless allowing that it may sometimes give way to other 
considerations). 
 97. See supra Part I.B (discussing threshold retributivism). 
 98. See generally supra Part I.B. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss4/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007] RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN THE REAL WORLD 851 
 
 
 
 
enforcement cost, this model would acknowledge that, at some point (the 
threshold point itself), pursuit of even the most serious offender would not 
be appropriate if tracking down that offender would necessitate enormous 
costs—either direct financial costs, or other costs such as the reduction in 
human liberty from intrusive searches for evidence, or the opportunity cost 
in terms of a lost chance to punish many other deserving offenders. 
In this scenario, then, a police department employing the threshold 
model would first pursue all the murderers, then pursue as many of the 
batterers as the budget would allow. 
3. Consequentialist Retributivism 
The consequentialist-retributivist, or CR, model differs from both other 
models in that it views imposing deserved punishment not as a duty but as 
a goal. Each of the other two models understands retributive justice as an 
obligation driving a particular enforcement agenda: in one case, pursuing 
the most offenders, and in the other, pursuing the gravest crimes. The CR 
model is outcome-oriented, seeking to maximize the total amount of 
deserved punishment the system imposes; that total is driven by a 
combination of the number of offenders caught, the amount of (deserved) 
punishment per offender, and the cost of apprehending each offender. 
Accordingly, a CR system would take into account both resource 
constraints and offense seriousness, balancing these two concerns by 
focusing on the per-unit cost of deserved punishment.99 
A model relying on cross-offense comparisons of the per-unit cost of 
punishment, however, raises a significant practical concern. To engage in 
such comparisons, such a model must assume the ability to rank crimes 
along a cardinal scale, not merely an ordinal one. In other words, every 
unit of punishment must have fixed and constant value, or else a known 
and identified rate of decreasing (or increasing) marginal value: a 300-unit 
crime must equal exactly three 100-unit crimes, or at least some identified 
quantity of 100-unit crimes. 
As typically understood, however, retributive punishment schemes can 
provide only ordinal, not cardinal, rankings of the seriousness of different 
crimes.100 The sentencing or other punishment ranges actually assigned by 
 
 
 99. See generally supra Part I.C. 
 100. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 323, 365 
(2004) (“There is little agreement among retributivists (or others) on how to match wrongdoing to 
specific levels or forms of punishment rather than a relative ranking—that is, a cardinal rather than 
merely an ordinal ranking.”). But cf. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 36B46 (1993) 
(discussing possible ways to construct a cardinal ranking of offenses). 
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law are at best imperfect, and possibly misleading, proxies for a genuine 
moral assessment of the relative severity of different crimes.101 
Accordingly, it may not be proper to assume that a single “20-year crime” 
is equal in moral weight to four “5-year crimes.”  
This limitation of retributive theory creates a serious difficulty for the 
potential to implement CR, which demands a means for determining 
whether or not a given array of punishments achieves more desert than 
another. It is important to note, however, that this exact difficulty 
confronts any other consequentialist model as well. Where CR must 
determine the relative moral wrongfulness of different offenses, 
utilitarianism must determine the relative harmfulness of different offenses 
in terms of setbacks to human welfare. Without such judgments, neither 
theory could manage to set priorities between different offenses. In short, 
the problem of devising a metric for balancing the costs of punishment 
against its benefits is profound, but also unavoidable for any 
comprehensive scheme that allows for such balancing rather than 
following some binding ex ante imperative. 
Further, as a practical matter, the legally prescribed punishment levels 
do specify the extent of the system’s real-world opportunity to impose 
punishment, and the role of the enforcement agents within the system is 
such that they are expected to pursue that opportunity to the extent 
possible. Thus it might be plausible as a second-best approximation to use 
actual punishments as a measure of the seriousness of crimes, or at least to 
conclude that a set of penalties generating more total punishment achieves 
the desert goal better than one that generates less. 
A crucial (and highly contestable) assumption here is that no prescribed 
punishment definitely exceeds the amount dictated by the offender’s moral 
desert. So long as all authorized punishment is less than or equal to what 
the offense merits, more punishment means more deserved punishment—
assuming the punishment is imposed on the right person, which is a 
distinct issue. The assumption, in other words, is that the legislature has 
itself sought to obey the retributive principle in defining crimes and setting 
their penalties.102 This may be a dubious assumption in the real world, but 
it seems fair to allow a retributive model of criminal justice to stipulate 
 
 
 101. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Dissent from the United States Sentencing Commission’s 
Proposed Guidelines, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1112, 1113–16 (1986) (criticizing federal 
sentencing guidelines for failing to consistently distinguish crimes based on relative seriousness, or 
any other principled considerations, and providing examples). 
 102. The possibility remains that a retributivist legislature would deliberately enact an “imperfect” 
criminal code (in a retributivist sense), precisely for the sake of advancing retributive goals in the real 
world. This possibility is addressed infra Part II.C. 
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that the law itself should be retributive in its design. While such a model 
must account for inevitable resource constraints, it need not design policy 
prescriptions around flaws or shortcomings in the substantive law, for the 
obvious policy prescription in such a situation is simply to amend the 
substantive law. 
For the hypothetical scenario set out above, the CR model, setting its 
priorities according to the per-unit cost of deserved punishment, would 
focus first on the aggravated battery offenses (and second on the murders), 
which provide the highest bang for the law enforcement buck and 
therefore enable the highest overall imposition of deserved punishment. 
B. Prosecutorial Discretion 
Prosecutors often use their discretion to decline to punish clearly 
deserving offenders, or to give such offenders less punishment than is 
legislatively authorized. Indeed, this is the norm rather than the exception. 
Well over ninety percent of cases are resolved with guilty pleas,103 almost 
all of which involve plea bargains, trading off a lesser amount of 
punishment in return for a certain conviction.104 The federal sentencing 
guidelines make the “plea discount” explicit by reducing an offender’s 
guideline sentence if he “clearly demonstrates acceptance of 
responsibility,”105 which generally requires a plea of guilty.106 
 
 
 103. See, e.g., FELONY SENTENCES 2002, supra note 85, at 8 tbl.9 (showing that in 2002, ninety-
five percent of all state felony convictions were obtained by guilty plea); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2006 
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, at fig.C, available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2006/ SBTOC06.htm (figures for 2002 to 2006 showing pleas were 
involved in 94.5% to 97.1% of cases annually during that period).  
 104. See G. NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING 1 (1997) (noting that an overwhelming 
number of the approximately ninety percent of U.S. criminal convictions resulting from guilty pleas 
are achieved through plea bargains); see also Daniel C. Richman, Bargaining About Future Jeopardy, 
49 VAND. L. REV. 1181, 1237 (1996) (“[P]lea bargaining is the dominant mode of adjudication . . . .”). 
See generally GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN 
AMERICA (2003). 
 105. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2006 FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch.7, § 3E1.1, 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/2006guid/3e1_1.html. 
 106. See Robert N. Strassfeld, Robert McNamara and the Art and Law of Confession: “A Simple 
Desultory Philippic (Or How I Was Robert McNamara’d into Submission),” 47 DUKE L.J. 491, 513–
14 (1997) (“The notes indicate certain circumstances that will preclude or strongly militate against an 
adjustment. The Guidelines presuppose that in most instances the defendant who seeks an adjustment 
will have pled guilty, and note 2 states that a defendant who denies factual elements of guilt, and only 
admits guilt and expresses remorse after conviction, is ineligible for an acceptance of responsibility 
adjustment.”); cf. id. at 514 n.115 (noting that the Guideline commentary recognizes “that there may 
be rare instances in which the defendant can manifest acceptance of responsibility despite a conviction 
at trial where the defendant had gone to trial to assert issues unrelated to his factual guilt, such as the 
constitutionality of the statute in question or the applicability of a statute to his conduct”). 
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Prosecutors also commonly use the testimony of some offenders as a 
means to facilitate prosecution of others, granting the testifying criminal 
reduced punishment (by way of sentencing departures for “substantial 
assistance”107 and the like) or no punishment (by way of a “cooperation 
agreement”108 or a grant of witness immunity109) as an inducement. 
Do these common practices violate the retributive principle? The 
balance of this section evaluates their validity under each of the three 
models. 
1. The Absolutist Model 
Under the absolutist model, law enforcement at the prosecutorial stage 
would focus on making certain that all, and only, identified wrongdoers 
were punished in an amount appropriate to their desert. Accordingly, the 
absolutist model would categorically ban plea bargaining, witness 
immunity, downward departures for substantial assistance, or any other 
failure to impose deserved punishment.110 
 
 
 107. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 105, § 5K1.1 (allowing downward sentencing 
departure for a defendant who has “provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution 
of another person who has committed an offense”). 
 Between 2003 and 2006, the rate of “substantial assistance” departures varied from 14.4% to 
15.9% of all federal criminal convictions. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 103, at fig.G. 
 108. Cooperation agreements involve a prosecutor’s informal promise not to prosecute a potential 
defendant, as opposed to a formal grant of immunity. See John G. Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant 
Accomplice, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1797, 1811 (2001). Prosecutors prefer such an arrangement for 
several practical reasons: “The prosecutor purchases not only the testimony, but also the opportunity to 
prepare the accomplice to testify. And an accomplice who undergoes hours of pretrial preparation is 
more predictable, and hence more valuable, than one who is forced to testify under a simple grant of 
immunity.” Id. at 1826–27. In addition, unlike statutory immunity, a promise not to prosecute may be 
conditioned on the witness providing full cooperation and truthful testimony. 
 109. Even if one considers only the federal jurisdiction, prosecutors make hundreds of immunity 
requests each year (in the federal system, prosecutors must receive authorization from the Attorney 
General before granting immunity). Federal immunity requests reached their peak in 1986, with 
prosecutors making 2,550 requests (involving 5,013 witnesses); since then, the number of requests has 
decreased, with 743 requests (involving 1,280 witnesses) occurring in 2006, the most recent year for 
which information is available. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2006, at tbl.5.1, available at http://www.albany.edu/ 
sourcebook/pdf/+512006.pdf. 
 The main reason for the decline in formal immunity grants is not that the practice of trading 
testimony for nonprosecution has waned but rather that cooperation agreements and other informal 
promises have replaced formal immunity grants. Further, the figures above relate only to the federal 
system; immunity grants in one form or another are provided in each of the fifty states as well. See 8 
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2281 n.11 (John T. McNaughten 
ed., rev. ed. 1961 & Supp. 1998) (listing state and federal immunity statutes). 
 110. If the legislature sometimes enacted laws that departed from the dictates of desert—which 
even a purely retributivist legislature might see reason to do, see infra Part II.C—a prosecutor might 
also confront cases in which a person deserved some punishment, but the punishment that would be 
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2. The Threshold Model 
As under the absolutist model, the threshold model adopts a view of 
punishment as a moral duty according to which it would be incumbent on 
prosecutors to pursue the agent-relative duty to punish each identified 
offender to the full extent of his or her desert. Thus, the threshold model 
would also generally ban plea bargaining, witness immunity, and the like. 
The only difference here is that the threshold view would not 
categorically ban these prosecutorial practices, but might allow them in 
cases where some especially bad outcome would result from not using 
them—as Moore has put it, they would be unavailable except when 
“needed to punish some very deserving criminals.”111 Moore does not 
further specify, however, just how “deserving” those criminals must be 
before the practices would be allowed. 
3. Consequentialist Retributivism 
The CR model would allow and even endorse plea bargaining and 
other such prosecutorial practices if they facilitated increases in the total 
amount of desert-based punishment the system could achieve. Unlike the 
absolutist and threshold models, the CR approach enables this result 
because it views the moral value of imposing deserved punishment in 
agent-neutral, not agent-relative, terms.112 That is, the CR view sees the 
goal of desert-based punishment in systemic terms as something to 
maximize overall, so that a sacrifice of desert is allowed in one case if it 
enables a more-than-offsetting gain in another case. The other two models, 
by contrast, see retribution as a duty binding institutional actors in each 
individual case, prohibiting such tradeoffs. As Michael Moore explains: 
[T]he consequentialist-retributivist will intentionally refuse to 
punish guilty persons whenever more guilty persons (or greater 
 
 
imposed was more than the person deserved (say, a draconian mandatory minimum). In such a 
situation, no matter what the prosecutor did, there would be a failure to impose all (and only) deserved 
punishment. What, then, is a retributivist prosecutor to do? 
 The absolutist model’s likely answer is that the prosecutor should pursue conviction, on the 
ground that failing to do so would involve a voluntary decision on the prosecutor’s part to violate a 
moral duty, whereas the overly severe punishment was not the prosecutor’s own choice but was 
imposed by the legislature. Notice that if the legislature’s expectation in enacting the law was that 
prosecutors would use the authorized sentence to bargain down to a lesser charge, or use their 
discretion to decline to prosecute except in serious cases, the absolutist model would lead to 
prosecutorial decisions frustrating the actual legislative agenda. 
 111. MOORE, supra note 14, at 158. 
 112. See supra Part I.C. 
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guilt) will be punished thereby. For the consequentialist-
retributivist, no matter how intrinsically good it is that the guilty 
receive their deserts, more of that good is to be preferred to less of 
it.113 
Thus, CR is the only model of real-world retribution that would condone 
various existing, and indeed routine, prosecutorial practices. 
C. Feedback Effects on Legislative Action 
A final aspect of real-world retribution worth noting is the possibility 
that the legislature itself, even if pursuing a retributive agenda, would be 
explicitly practical rather than principled in doing so. Such a legislature 
might enact rules that violate an ideal set of retributive rules, but do so for 
the sake of making retributively “right” outcomes more likely in actual 
cases. For example, the legislature might refuse to enact certain defenses 
that might properly bear on a person’s desert in the abstract, but are seen 
as susceptible to manipulation and abuse and therefore likely to frustrate 
punishment of the deserving, rather than promote exoneration of the 
innocent.114 The legislature might also devise substantive or evidentiary 
rules designed to promote accurate decisions in the majority of cases, 
though it is acknowledged that these rules would generate results that run 
counter to desert in some cases.115 
Finally, at least under a CR model of criminal justice, the legislature 
might manipulate offense definitions or punishment levels based on its 
awareness of how police and prosecutors exercise their discretion.116 For 
example, since CR allows prosecutorial plea bargaining, a CR legislature 
that anticipates bargaining and seeks to facilitate desert-maximizing 
bargains might deliberately authorize punishments exceeding an offense’s 
deserved punishment, expecting that prosecutors will use those higher 
punishments as a bargaining chip to negotiate pleas that approximate the 
offender’s actual desert. A retribution-oriented legislature might also 
 
 
 113. MOORE, supra note 14, at 157. 
 114. See ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 14, at 27B51. 
 115. See id. at 52B71; see also Bierschbach & Stein, supra note 6 (discussing interaction of 
substantive and evidentiary rules in promoting retributive justice). 
 116. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 
550–52 (2001) (discussing political and practical incentives for legislatures—whether driven by 
retributivist considerations or not—to enact overbroad criminal laws and overly high criminal 
penalties based on expectations about how enforcement will work); cf. Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. 
Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 635–44 
(2005) (providing examples of the trend toward overcriminalization and overly high penalties). 
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knowingly define offenses to be overbroad (in the sense of capturing some 
morally blameless conduct), relying on retribution-oriented prosecutors to 
exercise their discretion not to prosecute in cases where a legally guilty 
person is not also morally blameworthy. 
The possible spillover effects of real-world considerations into the 
substance, rather than merely the enforcement, of a retribution-seeking 
criminal law are worth noting here, but are somewhat tangent to this 
Article’s project. The goal here is to elaborate whether a retributive theory 
has any potential to provide a comprehensive scheme of criminal justice, 
rather than to anticipate or resolve every complication involved in 
implementing such a scheme. Still, it is worth noting that a real-world 
retributive model might have to recognize and account for the possibility 
that practical considerations might affect not only the priorities of 
enforcement agents but also the content of the substantive law. 
III. WEIGHING THE OPTIONS 
A. The Absolutist Model: A Practical Fiasco 
The absolutist view seems patently unworkable, and probably 
affirmatively undesirable, as it leads to real-world outcomes nobody 
would want. First, under at least some versions, this approach offers no 
clear reason to distinguish between more serious crimes and less serious 
ones. The amount of punishment must be proportionate to the offense, but 
the moral duty to punish is not scaled to reflect the offense’s gravity: as an 
absolute ex ante imperative, it categorically mandates punishment of petty 
thieves and murderers both.117 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, this view demands that we 
punish every known offender to the full extent of that person’s desert.118 
The police would not be able to let anyone off with a warning, even if 
doing so would give them time to find and arrest other, more serious 
offenders.119 Prosecutors would have to refuse to grant immunity to an 
offender who offers to identify a more serious offender (or ten other more 
serious offenders), and they would also be unable to balance the severity 
of punishment against its certainty by offering a plea bargain to prevent a 
 
 
 117. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text (discussing the demands of the absolutist 
view). 
 118. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text. 
 119. See supra Part II.A.1. 
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potentially inaccurate acquittal (or possible jury nullification).120 Beyond 
these particular practical difficulties, the general nature of the absolutist 
moral obligation is such that it creates an odd prioritization of known, 
identified offenders (whom the state must punish) over yet-undiscovered 
offenders (toward whom no such obligation has formed). Basing the 
state’s punishment agenda on the happenstance of which criminals it has 
already found, versus those it might find later, seems hard to defend in any 
principled way,121 and also might lead to perverse or distorted enforcement 
or prosecutorial incentives.122  
B. The Threshold Model: A Conceptual Muddle 
The threshold view of retributivism, advanced most prominently by 
Michael Moore,123 has been persuasively criticized by other 
commentators.124 The central difficulty of the approach is the jarring and 
seemingly unsupportable discontinuity of having deontological concerns 
dominate decisionmaking below the threshold, while consequentialist 
concerns become suddenly paramount once the threshold point is reached. 
What was seen as a binding ex ante principled commitment below the 
threshold is apparently no longer binding once the threshold is reached.125 
Further, any decision about where to locate the threshold will inevitably be 
arbitrary on some level.126 Finally, because the threshold is basically a 
 
 
 120. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 121. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 325 n.68 (noting that distinguishing between 
uncaught and caught-but-unpunished offenders for purposes of determining a duty to punish seems 
untenable even within a retributivist perspective). 
 122. Such a scheme might encourage both police and prosecutors to adopt a sort of “willful 
ignorance,” refusing to pursue leads or gather evidence about some offenders for the sake of avoiding 
the binding obligation to prosecute them to the full extent of their desert. 
 123. See supra notes 44–51 and accompanying text. 
 124. See Alexander, supra note 70; Christopher, supra note 5, at 151–57; Nancy Davis, 
Contemporary Deontology, in A COMPANION TO ETHICS 205 (Peter Singer ed., 1991); Anthony Ellis, 
Deontology, Incommensurability and the Arbitrary, 52 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 855 (1992). 
 Alexander notes some additional possible criticisms beyond those I describe in the text. Alexander 
points to the work of John Taurek, who raises the question “whether similar harms to different people 
should be aggregated in considering where our moral duties lie.” Alexander, supra note 70, at 897 
(citing John Taurek, Should the Numbers Count?, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 293, 293 (1977)). If such 
aggregation is inappropriate, then it would never be acceptable to impose harm on one person to 
prevent similar harm to any number of other people. Alexander also points to complications that arise 
when the likelihood or timing of the relevant consequential harms varies or is uncertain. See 
Alexander, supra note 70, at 904–05. 
 125. As Moore himself asks, “Why should goodness of consequences not count at all and then, at 
some point, count enormously in the sense that it fully determines the rightness of action?” MOORE, 
supra note 14, at 723. 
 126. See Ellis, supra note 124, at 859–70. 
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binary switch where consequences go from “off” (irrelevant) to “on” 
(paramount), bizarre or untenable results are bound to occur at decision 
points just above and below the threshold.127 
Moore offers a response to these critiques. He claims that below the 
threshold, consequences are not irrelevant but simply have not yet risen to 
the level where they outweigh the deontological principles. He gives the 
example of a dam, where water does not spill over until it reaches the top, 
but even the water at the bottom is contributing to the spillover.128 As to 
the charge of arbitrariness in establishing any threshold level, he claims 
the issue amounts to what philosophers call a “sorites paradox” involving 
vague predicates129—taking the classic example, our inability to state 
exactly how many stones make a “heap” does not mean there is no such 
thing as a heap of stones.130 Similarly, Moore argues, any disagreement 
 
 
 127. See Alexander, supra note 70, at 900 (“[O]ne might expect that moral outcomes in the 
neighborhood of such a radical discontinuity might seem weird or counterintuitive. And that 
expectation is borne out.”). Suppose that N is the crucial threshold number—say, the number of lives 
to be saved—that would provide a consequentialist justification for otherwise deontologically 
forbidden acts such as torturing someone for information. By definition, this means that a threat to N–1 
lives does not justify such torture, so eliminating the peril to just one of N jeopardized lives would 
suddenly make the prospective torture switch from morally acceptable (or even required) to morally 
unacceptable. On the other hand, if N–1 lives were in jeopardy from a potential bomb attack, 
enforcement authorities could deliberately move one more person into the zone of danger and thereby 
suddenly acquire the right to torture someone for information. See id. at 900B03 (providing several 
examples of such possible anomalies or deliberate manipulations around the threshold). 
 The essential argument here is that, faced with a risk of consequential harm exceeding the 
threshold, all one must do is prevent just enough harm to return the total below the threshold, at which 
point consequential considerations are by hypothesis no longer compelling. Accordingly, all harms 
below the final increment that surpasses the threshold “are pure moral ballast,” propping up that final 
increment, and can safely be ignored if the final increment is eliminated. Id. at 901. Accordingly, “a 
deontological threshold invites manipulation” around the margins of the threshold to achieve the 
desired result: one can eliminate just enough marginal risk so that consequentialist concerns no longer 
count, or create just enough marginal risk to get over the threshold and make consequentialist harms 
dominate the moral analysis. Id. at 903. 
 128. See MOORE, supra note 14, at 723 (crediting the analogy to Joseph Raz). Alexander 
questions the dam analogy, which implies that once the threshold level is reached, the acceptable 
tradeoff between harm imposed and harm avoided is one to one: for example, if one were allowed to 
take a single life to save 100 others, then one could take 2 lives to save 101 others, for “once the level 
of the dam is reached, one needs a foot of additional sandbagging to hold back each foot of water 
above that level.” Alexander, supra note 70, at 899. Alexander claims (correctly, in my view, and 
likely in Moore’s view as well) that the proper “conceptualization of thresholds is to see them as 
ratios” involving a geometric rather than linear relationship between the marginal harm caused and the 
marginal harm averted: if one may take a single life to save 100, one may only take 2 lives to save 200. 
Id. 
 129. See Sorites Paradox, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sorites-paradox/. “Sorites” is derived from the Greek word for “heap.” 
Id. 
 130. See MOORE, supra note 14, at 724 (“[T]his is no more than the medieval worry of how many 
stones make a heap.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
860 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:815 
 
 
 
 
about where exactly to locate the threshold does not mean it is nonsensical 
to recognize that consequences must matter at some point.131 
These analogies fail to rebut the substance of the critics’ claims, 
however. The dam metaphor merely exemplifies the peculiar focus of this 
approach on the final increment of harm that passes the threshold, while 
marginalizing other harms: we may safely ignore the buildup of water 
behind a 100-foot dam until it rises a single inch above the top, at which 
point our real concern is not with all the water, but only the top inch.132 
The sorites-paradox analogy is inapt, for the problem of identifying the 
threshold is not analogous to the problem of defining a heap. First, the 
concept of a heap exists along a continuum, with certain groups of stones 
seeming more or less like a heap, whereas the threshold is binary and 
discontinuous: consequences do not control, then they do.133 Further, 
nothing of moral consequence turns on whether a certain number of stones 
are or are not a heap, whereas the threshold between caring and not caring 
about consequences is deeply important, requiring some degree of 
specification and justification.134 The threshold-setting issue, therefore, is 
not just a vague-predicate problem but a gap in the theory.135 The gap 
becomes clearer when the focus of analysis is not a general question of 
what conduct to criminalize, but an effort to steer the routine decisions of 
numerous police and prosecutors who need guidelines regarding whether 
and when it is acceptable to let someone off without charge, grant 
immunity, plea bargain, and so on.136 
Another question about threshold deontology is whether it really 
collapses into full-fledged consequentialism.137 The critique here is that by 
 
 
 131. See id. 
 132. See Alexander, supra note 70, at 901 (“Like the water below the level of the dam, [the] only 
moral role [of harms to people below the threshold] is to boost others above that level so that they 
become morally entitled to be rescued.”). 
 133. See id. at 908–09 (“[I]n order to make use of the sorites analogy, the threshold deontologist 
must reject the idea that there are discontinuities as we move from deontologically forbidden to 
consequentially required.”). 
 134. See Ellis, supra note 124, at 859; Alexander, supra note 70, at 909 (“Denying that there is a 
specific cutoff point in threshold deontology is arbitrary and troubling in a way that is disanalogous to 
typical sorites examples.”); Christopher, supra note 5, at 155 n.353 (“[W]hile nothing of significance 
rests on whether the number of stones chosen as comprising a heap is arbitrary, the dividing line 
between what is morally right and wrong should not be arbitrary.”). 
 135. See Alexander, supra note 70, at 905–10. 
 136. See supra Part II.B. 
 137. See, e.g., GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW—THE GENERAL PART 729 (2d ed. 1961) 
(noting this problem and endorsing consequentialism); MOORE, supra note 14, at 721 (“Many think 
that the [threshold version of an] agent-relative view just sketched, allowing as it does consequences to 
override moral absolutes when those consequences are horrendous enough, collapses into a 
consequentialist morality after all.”). 
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allowing consequences to count sometimes, the threshold view allows the 
camel’s nose under the tent. Another version of the argument suggests that 
the “deontological” rules of threshold deontology might really just serve 
as consequentialist heuristics. On this view, threshold deontologists are 
truly consequentialists at heart, and they are merely seeking to guide the 
consequentialist analysis by suggesting rules of thumb that will typically 
promote good results but may be ignored where they clearly would not.138 
Larry Alexander has noted such a possibility, though he does not think it 
accurately describes threshold theorists’ understanding of their own 
position.139 Michael Moore agrees that he is not a closet consequentialist 
and that threshold deontology is meaningfully distinct: “Even if the 
goodness of consequences is always relevant to the rightness of actions for 
a threshold deontologist, the goodness of consequences does not determine 
the rightness of actions as it does for a consequentialist.”140 
A truly consequentialist version of retributivism, then, provides a 
distinct approach from threshold deontology—and, as the next section 
argues, the consequentialist-retributivist view offers a superior method for 
bringing retributive justice into the real world. 
C. Consequentialist Retributivism: A Workable Balance? 
The consequentialist-retributivist (CR) view strikes a balance between 
adhering to retribution as a force that justifies and drives punishment and 
recognizing that competing real-world goals prevent an absolute, 
unyielding commitment to retribution. Unlike the absolutist and threshold 
models, the CR approach does not generate seemingly absurd results. In 
fact, the notion of maximizing overall (deserved) punishment seems to 
accord with the most natural, intuitive response to the problem of how 
retributive justice would or should work in practice. If the system is unable 
to impose all deserved punishment all the time, a natural second-best 
strategy is to impose as much deserved punishment as possible.141 
 
 
 138. See Alexander, supra note 70, at 910B11. 
 139. See id. at 911 (“In the end, however, I doubt that Moore—or Nagel or Nozick for that 
matter—want to grasp this lifeline. Nothing in what Moore or the others have written suggests that 
they are consequentialists at the level of their deepest moral beliefs.”). 
 140. MOORE, supra note 14, at 722 n.132. 
 141. The reader may be inclined to wonder whether my support of a consequentialist perspective 
on retributive justice implies, or demands, that I endorse such a perspective across the board, thinking 
all principled commitments are better seen as goals to maximize ex post, instead of binding ex ante 
obligations. 
 While that may be a sensible view, this Article’s project is to focus on retributive justice 
specifically, and so I do not commit here to an overarching consequentialist view, nor am I convinced 
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As noted earlier, however, despite its powerful intuitive appeal as a 
strategy for achieving retributive goals in practice, the CR approach has, 
thus far, apparently found no adherents in the academic literature.142 
Indeed, only two commentators seem to have discussed the idea at any 
length: Michael Moore has described the possibility of CR,143 though 
without embracing the approach himself;144 and David Dolinko, 
 
 
my position here compels me to do that. Cf. Joel Feinberg, The Classic Debate, in PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW, supra note 37, at 646, 648–49 (noting that a utilitarian “in respect to punishment” need not “be a 
general utilitarian across the board”).  
 Unlike some other possible principled commitments—such as, perhaps, respect for liberty—the 
principle of retribution is not merely passive in its demands on the state. Rather, retributive justice 
requires that the state affirmatively undertake to design and maintain institutions designed to achieve 
or fulfill the principle. In other words, punishment is necessarily costly—and, given the limits of 
human knowledge, necessarily imperfect—and therefore necessarily confronts practical resource 
constraints in a way other principled commitments may not. 
 One might conceive of a version of retributivism that imposes no such affirmative duty but only 
imposes a negative burden on the state to avoid violating the principle of deserved punishment. In fact, 
my elaboration of the absolutist model of retributivism, as it would apply in practice, offers such a 
version of the theory. As the discussion of that model in the text makes clear, though, such a scheme 
would (in my view) generate undesirable or even absurd results and is therefore unsatisfying in this 
context. However, such a conception might work for a model of, say, distributive or corrective 
justice—demanding in the latter context, for example, that adjudicative institutions follow certain 
principles in resolving private disputes without obliging the state to actively pursue corrective justice 
on its own. (Note that under such a view, principled commitments operate in a way that accords with 
their usual description as side constraints on action, rather than as affirmative obligations to act.) In 
any event, I take no position here as to the overall necessity or desirability of seeing all moral 
commitments through a consequentialist lens. 
 142. Of course, as the text notes, some recent criminal law work by writers such as Dan Markel 
(as well as Douglas Husak, see generally Husak, supra note 19), and even the recent work of Michael 
Moore (as committed a deontologist as anyone in the criminal theory community), has effectively 
adopted a CR perspective or at least suggested the importance of forcing retributive theory to 
accommodate practical concerns. Mitchell Berman’s account of retributivism also seems to have some 
resonance with the CR approach. See supra note 37. 
 The general lack of outright enthusiasm for CR in the criminal theory literature is perhaps even 
more interesting or unusual given that another body of recent philosophical work has debated the 
broad question of whether it is possible (and, if so, desirable) to “consequentialize” any deontological 
or otherwise nonconsequentialist moral theory—i.e., to translate the theory’s moral rules into an 
expressly consequentialist framework. See, e.g., James Dreier, Structures of Normative Theories, 76 
MONIST 22 (1993); Jennie Louise, Relativity of Value and the Consequentialist Umbrella, 54 PHIL. Q. 
518 (2004); Philip Pettit, The Consequentialist Perspective, in THREE METHODS OF ETHICS 92 (Marcia 
Baron et al. eds., 1997); Douglas W. Portmore, Can an Act-Consequentialist Theory Be Agent 
Relative?, 38 AM. PHIL. Q. 363 (2001); Douglas W. Portmore, Consequentializing Moral Theories, 88 
PAC. PHIL. Q. 39 (2007); Campbell Brown, Consequentialise This (Sept. 10, 2004) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). For purposes of this article, I take no position on these broader 
questions, see supra note 141, though obviously there is much in the larger pro-consequentializing 
perspective that would resonate with the CR view. 
 143. Moore provides a discussion in his book Placing Blame that reprises an account he had 
offered earlier in a law review article. See MOORE, supra note 14, at 155–61; Michael Moore, 
Justifying Retributivism, 27 ISR. L. REV. 15 (1993). Dolinko’s article was responding to Moore’s law 
review article. 
 144. In the chapter describing CR, Moore professes agnosticism. See MOORE, supra note 14, at 
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responding to Moore, has offered a critique of CR.145 Interestingly, 
though, Moore’s most recent work appears to support a version of CR for 
some aspects of the criminal justice system, noting that consequentialist 
concerns can (and indeed must146) guide “those who design the general 
shape of legal institutions,”147 even as binding agent-relative obligations 
should continue to apply to individual actors within those institutions.148 
Though clearly not a total embrace of CR, this marks a significant shift for 
Moore149 and indicates the appeal or even necessity of adopting a 
consequentialist perspective in the face of inevitable resource constraints. 
Others have tacitly indicated support for CR without committing to it 
decisively or providing any extended elaboration of CR per se. Louis 
Kaplow and Steven Shavell, in a discussion oriented toward discrediting 
the retributivist approach, have observed that some version of CR may 
hold out the best (or only) promise of implementing retributive goals: 
It also seems that, if the retributive conception of fairness were to be 
made more complete, it would have more of a consequentialist 
character and thus resemble the kind of theory that retributivists 
have resisted. For example, it is hard to imagine that any theory 
could help us to decide how much to spend to catch violators 
without regard to the number of additional violators that might be 
caught as a consequence. Likewise, one would suppose that it 
would make a difference whether the additional violators that would 
be apprehended had committed serious or relatively trivial wrongs, 
 
 
159 (“[N]othing in the present project requires that we decide between deontological versus 
consequentialist retributivism.”). Elsewhere, however, Moore refers to his own “non-consequentialist 
views on morality,” id. at 719, and embraces the threshold-deontology approach. See id. at 719B24 
(discussing threshold view and contrasting it with consequentialism). 
 145. See David Dolinko, Retributivism, Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic Goodness of 
Punishment, 16 LAW & PHIL. 507 (1997). Russell Christopher has also given a succinct critique of CR, 
relying on Dolinko’s arguments. See Christopher, supra note 5, at 148B51; id. at 148 (noting that 
Dolinko’s article is “perhaps the only assessment of Moore’s consequentialist retributivism”). 
 146. See Moore, Reflections, supra note 66, at 1552 (“So at the level of justifying our general 
institutions of criminal . . . law, I take us all to be consequentialists.”). 
 147. Id. at 1551. 
 148. See id.; see also Moore, Patrolling the Borders, supra note 66. Moore hints that even as to 
individual actors, these imperatives might not truly constitute deontological commands but some form 
of rule-consequentialist guidelines. See Moore, Reflections, supra note 66, at 1552 (“But this would be 
at most a kind of ‘government house’ deontology, a ‘deontology’ to be followed by agents because the 
legal institution requiring their adherence to it will produce the best consequences overall.”). Yet 
Moore also indicates that he retains a commitment to “deontology for individual actors,” contrasting it 
with his “consequentialism about institutions.” Id. at 1552 n.79. 
 149. See id. at 1552 n.79 (“For a life-long committed deontologist, this is a troublesome 
conclusion to reach after all these years. Yet at the level of allocating scarce social resources, I think 
the concession is inevitable.”). 
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suggesting that different value weightings would be put on different 
wrongful acts. . . . [A] complete retributive theory would probably 
have to be a complex consequentialist one, much less different in 
structure from welfare economics than one would have suspected. 
(It would still be different in substance, in that some criteria other 
than effects on individuals’ well-being would determine the value of 
punishing offenders.)150 
Finally, as noted above, Dan Markel has implied that his own brand of 
retributivism is a version of CR, but he does not offer a sustained 
explanation or defense of this aspect of his theory.151 
This Article, then, offers the first explicit advocation of CR. My 
support of CR follows from this Article’s premise (that retributive justice, 
meaning punishment according to desert, is worth pursuing152) and its 
argument thus far (that CR is the only effective, or at least worthwhile, 
means of pursuing retributive justice in the real world). In short, as the 
Kaplow and Shavell discussion suggests, CR is the only version of a 
retribution-oriented account of criminal justice that might accommodate 
the various real-world considerations necessary for a theory to work in 
practice. 
But does CR work in theory?153 Dolinko directs his criticisms at this 
question. Dolinko notes that that the CR perspective might enable 
retributivism to surmount some objections to its amenability to practical 
implementation,154 but he objects to CR as antithetical to the broader 
retributivist project in the abstract.155 (It may be worth noting that 
 
 
 150. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 310 n.36. Elsewhere Kaplow and Shavell cite Moore’s 
reference to the possibility of consequentialist retributivism (and Dolinko’s response). See id. at 313 
nn.43B44. 
 151. See supra notes 58–64 and accompanying text. 
 152. As noted earlier, this Article does not seek to defend the principle of retribution but simply 
posits that retribution has some value. See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text. Plenty, perhaps 
too much, has already been written in defense of the retributivist principle. See generally John 
Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238 (1979) (identifying, in previous scholarly 
literature, nine distinct approaches to expressing or defending a retributivist theory). 
 153. Economists seem to be the most common butt of the joke involving some head-in-the-clouds 
intellectual type asking, “I know it works in practice, but will it work in theory”? See Robert P. 
Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights 
Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1391 (1996); Ira P. Robbins, Whither (Or Wither) Habeas 
Corpus?: Observations on the Supreme Court’s 1985 Term, 111 F.R.D. 265 (1986); see also Julian 
Barnes, Hate and Hedonism, THE NEW YORKER, July 7, 2003, at 74 (presenting the joke as involving a 
Frenchman’s rejoinder to a practical English proposal). 
 154. See Dolinko, supra note 145, at 515 (“[A] consequentialist version of retributivism may 
appear desirable, because the inevitable error-proneness of punishment institutions creates a difficulty 
for deontological retributivism . . . .”). 
 155. See id. at 510 (“‘[C]onsequentialist retributivism’ is not, in fact, a coherent form of 
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Dolinko’s objective is to argue against retributivism in all its forms, rather 
than to defend a deontological version against the CR approach.)156 His 
central claim is that CR is conceptually incoherent because it demands 
adherence to two incompatible propositions. The first proposition, which 
Dolinko calls “the intrinsic-good claim,” is that “the end-result of 
inflicting deserved punishment [is] a good state of affairs,”157 a view that 
treats retributive justice as a good result or consequence of punishing and 
therefore enables the CR position.158 The second proposition, which 
Dolinko calls “the desert claim,” is that retributive justice must be the only 
basis for imposing punishment, with any other considerations excluded.159 
These two propositions are incompatible, Dolinko notes, because the 
intrinsic-good claim “compels us to acknowledge that the goodness or 
badness of other consequences of inflicting punishment should also be 
relevant to whether the punishment is justified. And this runs afoul of . . . 
the desert claim . . . .”160 This leads Dolinko to conclude that CR is an 
untenable view.161 
Dolinko is correct that the intrinsic-good claim and the desert claim, as 
he presents them, are incompatible. This incompatibility is not fatal to CR, 
though, for CR does not demand adherence to both claims. Rather, CR 
adopts the intrinsic-good claim and abandons the desert claim.162 This 
feature of CR is the very feature that distinguishes it from deontological 
retributivism: as a consequentialist theory, CR does not view desert as a 
fundamental ex ante obligation (or restraint), but rather as one good to be 
balanced against other possible goods in determining whether punishment 
 
 
retributivism at all, given a quite standard view (which Moore espouses) as to what retributivism is.”); 
id. at 513 (“[T]o be both a consequentialist and a retributivist is not, after all, a tenable position; it is 
well-nigh impossible, given a standard account of retributivism (such as Moore himself presents).”). 
 156. See id. at 508 (“This paper will argue that a consequentialist version of retributivism actually 
encounters grave difficulties, and that these difficulties reflect the problematic nature of retributivism 
itself.”). 
 157. Id. at 516. 
 158. See id. (“The first proposition—the intrinsic-good claim—generates the urge to view 
retributivism as a consequentialist theory.”). 
 159. See id. (describing the desert claim as demanding that non-desert “consequences cannot be 
relevant to the justification of punishment”). 
 160. Id.; see also id. at 513 (noting that “no plausible consequentialism could take [desert] as the 
only good-making characteristic”); Berman, supra note 8, at 48 (“[W]hile the effectuating of 
retributive justice could fairly count among the practice’s rational justifications, it is unclear how, 
except by fiat, the retributivist can identify realization of this particular consequence as a justifying 
aim without allowing that the aim is, accordingly, to realize net good consequences generally.”). 
 161. See Dolinko, supra note 145, at 515 (“[A] consequentialist version of retributivism appears 
impossible, at least if we insist that the meting out of just deserts is the only beneficial consequence of 
punishment relevant to its justification.”). 
 162. See supra Part I.C (discussing general features of CR perspective). 
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is appropriate in a specific case. At the same time, CR differs from 
standard-issue consequentialism in that it treats desert-based punishment 
as having inherent, and significant, value. 
Dolinko is certainly right that many retributivist theorists, including 
Moore, adopt the desert claim.163 But none of them, including Moore, has 
adopted CR.164 There is thus no inconsistency (at least in this regard) in 
their views, nor is there any inconsistency in adopting a contrary position 
that accepts the intrinsic-good claim but gives up the desert claim. The CR 
perspective does require, in some sense, a diluted commitment to 
retributive goals, for it must admit retribution to be just one of various 
goods worth pursuing. Unlike deontological approaches, which claim that 
desert is always both a necessary and sufficient condition of punishment, 
CR might have to take the softer view that desert is nearly always 
sufficient, and in rare cases not necessary, as a basis for punishing. But 
Dolinko is incorrect to conclude that this concession is fatal to CR—either 
by making CR incoherent or by making it toothless.165 It is entirely 
possible to support a version of the retributive principle—that imposing 
deserved punishment is intrinsically good and imposing undeserved 
punishment (or failing to impose deserved punishment) is intrinsically 
 
 
 163. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 14, at 153 (“Punishment is justified, for a retributivist, solely by 
the fact that those receiving it deserve it. Punishment of deserving offenders may produce beneficial 
consequences other than giving offenders their just deserts. . . . Yet for a retributivist these are a happy 
surplus that punishment produces and form no part of what makes punishment just . . . .”); see also 
Dolinko, supra note 145, at 516 n.27 (citing retributivists advancing desert claims). 
 164. Cf. Dolinko, supra note 142, at 507–08 (“One feature on which retributivists and their critics 
have generally agreed is that retributivism is very much a non-consequentialist theory.”). 
 165. Dolinko writes: 
[A] deterrence theorist . . . [may] believe that a guilty person’s receiving his deserved 
punishment is, in itself and regardless of its consequences, a good state of affairs—i.e., is 
intrinsically good. That will not be the deterrence theorist’s reason for inflicting the 
punishment . . . but it may nevertheless be an idea he accepts. . . . 
 What distinguishes the retributivist from the deterrence theorist cannot, therefore, be that 
only the former regards it as intrinsically good for a guilty person to be punished. Rather, 
what is distinctive about the retributivist must be the role played in her theory by the intrinsic 
goodness of punishing the guilty. For the retributivist, this intrinsic goodness cannot be an 
irrelevancy or a mere happy accident. It must be either (i) the reason for engaging in the 
practice of punishment (its rational justification), or (ii) the reason why that practice is 
morally permissible (its moral justification), or both. 
Id. at 517–18. It seems to me that the penultimate sentence of this quote is accurate, but the final 
sentence is not—at least with respect to an adherent of CR. For such a person, the intrinsic goodness of 
punishing the guilty is no “irrelevancy or mere happy accident” but a strongly relevant factor in the 
overall calculus that weighs the good and bad aspects of the decision to punish or not. This is what 
distinguishes the CR adherent from Dolinko’s “deterrence theorist,” for whom the intrinsic goodness 
of desert (even if acknowledged) merits no weight in that calculus. At the same time, for the CR 
adherent, desert is not the justification (rational or moral) for punishing, but merely one (highly 
significant) criterion contributing to the consequentialist balancing. 
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bad—while acknowledging that other goods or bads may outweigh 
application of that principle in some cases.166 
Of course, asserting that CR seems like the only feasible way to 
advance retributivist goals in the real world is not the same thing as 
offering a full articulation of how CR would work in practice. That 
complicated task is beyond the scope of this Article, which seeks only to 
offer a generalized account of how a real-world criminal justice system 
might pursue a retributive agenda, rather than a particular account of how 
a given system would or should do so. 
Even for present purposes, however, it is worth noting the main general 
implications of the CR approach and the issues any effort to employ it 
would confront. Foremost among these is the significant difficulty of 
ascertaining how much weight the “goodness” of desert should merit in 
the overall consequentialist analysis. The very notion of calculating the 
value of desert along some metric that would enable its comparison to 
other goods, like crime reduction or cost savings, might seem either odd or 
patently impossible.167 Yet almost any cost-benefit analysis inevitably 
involves difficult or even unsavory apple-orange comparisons of the “how 
much money is a human life worth” sort. Without minimizing the 
complexity (and perhaps even the ineradicable moral contestability) of 
such judgments, they are necessarily made all the time, and recognizing 
the tradeoffs they involve at least serves to focus attention and debate. 
Any further exploration of just how good desert is relative to other 
consequences is, again, beyond the scope of the present Article, which 
seeks only to provide a general framework under which retributivism can 
maintain any relevance as a real-world, rather than idealized, vision of 
criminal justice without either overwhelming other considerations entirely 
(as under deontological theories) or being dismissed as irrelevant (as under 
standard utilitarian consequentialism). One possible way, though by no 
means the only way, to approach the question might be to collect empirical 
data regarding the extent to which people tend to value achieving desert 
relative to other goals, such as procedural fairness. Some of this work is 
already being done, with interesting and promising results.168 
 
 
 166. See Joel Feinberg, Justice and Personal Desert, in DOING AND DESERVING 60 (1970) (“[A] 
person’s desert of X is always a reason for giving X to him, but not always a conclusive reason, [as] 
considerations irrelevant to his desert can have overriding cogency in establishing how he ought to be 
treated on balance.”). 
 167. But cf. ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 14, at 137–39, 183–85 (proposing an instrumentalist 
framework for considering the value of desert for purposes of trading it off against other values, such 
as procedural fairness). 
 168. See, e.g., id. at 183–85 (discussing empirical studies of relative significance of procedural 
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A corollary to the difficulty of specifying the value of retributive 
justice as a good is that the CR view, while having the advantage of 
offering a feasible means for achieving retributive justice in the real world, 
has the drawback of no longer offering a mandate for doing so. By 
framing retribution as a moral duty, standard deontological retributive 
theories evade the thorny question of whether achieving retributive justice 
is worth the costs it imposes.169 If retributive justice is no longer a moral 
imperative but merely a good like other goods, some further explanation is 
required as to why we must seek this good rather than others (including 
the good of cost savings),170 or why the state rather than private 
individuals must be the sole repository of the power to punish.171 Further, 
under the CR view, desert also becomes a reason to punish, but not the 
reason to punish; other good consequences, like deterrence, might also 
justify punishment in some cases or might be needed to justify punishing 
at all, given its costs.172 CR provides a practical method for implementing 
 
 
“legitimacy” and substantive “moral credibility” for laypersons’ assessments of justice and fairness). 
 169. Some commentators have noted, however, that the justification of retributive institutions 
should face the same questions even if retribution is seen as a moral duty. See Husak, supra note 19, at 
999 (“The difficulty I have mentioned [of needing to show that achieving retribution is worth its costs] 
is not resolved if we hold that society has not only the right, but also the duty, to impose deserved 
punishment. . . . The burden is not merely to show that the imposition of punishment is a duty, but also 
to show that it is a duty of sufficient weight or stringency to justify the creation of an institution with 
the drawbacks I have recounted.”). 
 170. See DUFF, supra note 5, at 199 (noting the “logical gap between the claim that wrongdoers 
deserve to suffer—that it is good that they should suffer—and the claim that it is for us, or for the 
state, to ensure that they suffer”); Dolinko, supra note 145, at 519 (“Once one acknowledges an 
irreducible plurality of intrinsic goods, ‘X is intrinsically good’ no longer leads straightforwardly to 
‘There is an obligation to bring about X’—let alone to an obligation to create official institutions to 
bring X about!”); Douglas N. Husak, Retribution in Criminal Theory, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 959, 975 
(2000) (“The intrinsic goodness of realizing a principle of retributive justice would justify punishment 
in a possible world (such as a divine realm) . . . . Unfortunately, that possible world is not our world. In 
our world, we must sympathize with citizens who balk when asked to fund an institution that has the 
sole objective of realizing retributive justice.”). 
 171. See, e.g., Dolinko, supra note 145, at 522 (“Rationally justifying the institution of 
punishment requires showing not merely that punishment is important, but that it cannot or should not 
be left in private hands. And showing that seems to demand attention to the contrasting consequences 
of private vengeance and publicly-imposed punishment.”); Husak, supra note 170, at 972 (“If I am 
correct, our retributive beliefs only require that culpable wrongdoers be given their just deserts by 
being made to suffer . . . . These beliefs do not require that culpable wrongdoers be given their just 
deserts by being made to suffer by the state through the imposition of punishment.”). But see Alon 
Harel, Why Only the State May Inflict Criminal Sanctions (Sept. 25, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017298; cf. Kenworthey Bilz, The Puzzle of 
Delegated Revenge, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1059 (2007) (providing psychological account to explain citizens’ 
willingness to “delegate” punishment power to state). 
 172. See Husak, supra note 170, at 976–77 (“What is needed . . . is some additional value that 
punishment can be expected to attain—a value which, when added to the value of realizing retributive 
justice, will justify the institution of punishment. This value, I submit, is crime reduction. . . . The 
benefits of crime reduction, when added to the intrinsic goodness of achieving retributive justice 
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retributive goals, but at the considerable cost of denying those goals 
primacy in the conceptual justification of criminal law.173 
A second obvious complication is the task, noted earlier, of 
establishing an appropriate measure of the relative seriousness of different 
crimes for purposes of maximizing desert-based punishment.174 Absent the 
ability to weigh the gravity of one offense against another, CR cannot 
establish an enforcement agenda. Whether the actual punishment levels set 
by the legislature for different offenses serve as an appropriate proxy for 
offenses’ relative seriousness is an unresolved, and highly debatable, 
proposition.175 
One further question raised by the potential adoption of CR as a guide 
to enforcing the criminal law is whether, for the sake of conceptual 
consistency, the CR perspective should drive the substance of criminal law 
as well. Under such a view, criminal prohibitions, like the mechanisms for 
enforcing those prohibitions, would apply in an agent-neutral fashion. One 
possible consequence of this perspective would be the radical expansion of 
justification defenses to allow violation of criminal rules any time doing so 
would prevent an even greater violation or set of violations. Unlike the 
existing lesser-evils or self-defense justifications, this perspective would 
impose no limitation on the means chosen to minimize the moral wrong, 
such as a ban on initiating harm against an innocent party: A could kill B 
now to prevent C from killing two or more other people later.176 
 
 
(hopefully) offset the drawbacks of punishment. Contrary to pure retributivists like Moore, a theory of 
criminal law and punishment must find some justificatory role for crime reduction.”); KAPLOW & 
SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 313 (“[M]any retributivists might, on reflection, concede that the 
consequences of punishment—in terms of the number of wrongful acts and the number of instances of 
unfair punishment—do matter to normative evaluation. Otherwise, their position is inconsistent with 
their belief that the occurrence of wrongful acts and the imposition of unfair punishment each involve 
injustice. But if such consequences matter, then deterrence would become highly relevant for 
retributivists, a conclusion that runs counter to their professed position.”). 
 173. See generally Dolinko, supra note 145, at 518–27 (describing how the conception of 
retributive justice as an intrinsic good fails, without more, to justify the practice of state-imposed 
punishment); see also supra notes 36–37 (describing accounts of retribution under which punishment 
is permissible but not mandatory). 
 174. See supra Part II.A.3. 
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CONCLUSION 
Standard retributive-justice theories offer justifications for having 
institutions of punishment but have surprisingly little to say about how 
those institutions should actually do their work. This Article has sought to 
describe how the retributive principle might fit into a full theory of 
criminal justice, rather than only a theory of punishment. The most 
sensible means for incorporating retributive goals into a general theory of 
criminal justice is to adopt the approach of “consequentialist 
retributivism,” or CR. 
The CR approach may seem a mixed blessing for many retributivists, 
however, for it not only giveth, but also taketh away. While potentially 
offering a means to expand the application of retributive principles beyond 
mere abstraction and into the real world, CR also undercuts the 
independent force of retributivism as a theory of punishment. Under CR, 
unlike “standard” deontological retributivist theories, desert is no longer a 
freestanding absolute basis for imposing or withholding punishment. 
Rather, the underlying justification for punishment rests on a more general 
balancing of its consequences, and retributive goals count as only one 
factor in that balancing. Retributive justice, then, may enter the real world, 
but in doing so, it must allow other considerations to share space on the 
ideal plane where criminal law’s motivating principles reside. 
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